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 This dissertation studies three different aspects related to economic development 
in Latin America. I analyze the causes of political instability, the relationship between 
financial development and economic growth, and the effect of inequality on economic 
growth in Latin America. The findings from this empirical research are relevant for 
policymaking in the region. 
 Chapter One studies the determinants of political instability in Latin America. In 
this analysis, political instability is measured with the first principal component of nine 
variables related to political instability: assassinations, coups, government crises, anti-
government demonstrations, riots, strikes, purges, guerrilla activity, and revolutions. 
This measure of instability is appropriate since I show that it closely matches historical 
events and conditions in Latin American countries during the period of analysis. Using 
a sample of 18 Latin American countries from 1971 to 2000, I find three important 
results. First, countries with higher democracy scores tend to experience less instability, 
while those with factionalized political parties are more unstable. Second, I find that 
income inequality, ethnic fractionalization, and urbanization have a nonlinear effect on 
instability. I show that increases in income inequality raise instability up to a point, after 
which any further increases lower instability. Ethnic fractionalization and urban growth 
have the opposite effect, whereby initial increases in either decreases instability up to a 
point, after which any further increases produce higher levels of instability. Third, I find 
that the only macroeconomic factor that has a significant impact on instability is trade 
openness, where an increase of this measure promotes political stability. 
 x 
 Chapter Two presents an analysis of the causal relationship between financial 
development and economic growth in Latin America. There is a big debate on whether 
financial development causes growth or vice versa, and there are few empirical tests on 
this relationship at the regional level. The analysis of the relationship between financial 
development and economic growth in Latin America is important since countries in this 
region experienced improvements in their financial sectors, but they are still financially 
underdeveloped. Using a sample of 13 Latin American countries from 1961 to 2004, I 
find that there is a bi-directional causality between financial development and economic 
growth. Nonetheless, once the sample is divided by initial income levels, I find that the 
bi-directional causality between financial development and economic growth only holds 
for countries with higher initial income levels. For those countries with lower initial 
income levels, evidence shows that financial development follows economic growth 
and that financial development does not cause economic growth. 
 Chapter Three empirically analyzes the effect of inequality on economic growth 
in Latin American countries. I use the area of family farms as a percentage of total 
agricultural holdings as a measure of inequality. In a sample of 18 Latin American 
countries from 1960 to 2004, I find a nonlinear effect of inequality on growth. This 
finding implies that the effect of equality on growth depends on the current levels of 
resource distribution, where the effect of equality on growth is increasing up to a certain 
level, after this level, the effect on growth is decreasing. For the purpose of robustness, I 
use a different measure of inequality that takes into consideration the distribution of 
agricultural and non-agricultural resources and address for endogeneity. I find that the 
nonlinear effect of inequality on growth is robust to these different approaches. In 
 xi 
addition, I find that those countries that are highly urbanized benefit the most from 
increases in equality in terms of the share of family farms.  
 From this research, there are three main implications for policymakers. First, 
Chapter One provides a good overview on what policymakers could do to decrease 
political instability in Latin America. The strengthening of democracy, a more equally 
distributed society, and further trade liberalization can promote stability in the region. 
Second, from the empirical analysis in Chapter Two, it can be concluded that financial 
reforms will not necessarily have the same effects in all Latin American countries. The 
positive effects of financial development on growth only hold for those countries with 
initial high income levels. Policymakers must take this into consideration, since there 
may be other complementary institutions that allow financial development to positively 
affect growth. Third, Chapter Three shows that inequality, in terms of resource 
distribution, has a nonlinear effect on growth. This is relevant since it is shown that the 
majority of Latin American countries are currently at levels of resource distribution 
where increases in equality produce greater economic growth. Policies that promote 
agricultural activity at a small scale are beneficial for the region. Another important 
implication is that policies which promote a more equal distribution of human capital 
will also result in higher economic growth in the majority of the Latin American 









 The link between political instability and economic development is well 
established. For example, the theoretical literature has long argued that instability 
reduces the incentive to accumulate physical capital. Investments in physical capital are 
often difficult to reverse, which means that investors will postpone new capital projects 
and wait until the policy environment clarifies, resort to purely speculative activities, or 
move their money abroad.
1
 Subsequent empirical tests of this link have provided 
support for the hypothesis.  
 However, much less work has been done on determining the underlying causes 
of political instability. In this paper, I do exactly this in a panel of 18 Latin American 
countries from 1971 to 2000. I choose to focus on Latin America because the problem 
of instability seems especially relevant there.
2
 For instance, during the sample period, 
there were more than 450 political assassinations, 20 coups, more than 140 guerrilla 
wars and revolutions, and 113 crises that threatened to bring down sitting governments. 
The most politically unstable country of the group, Argentina, managed to rack up 45 
assassinations, three revolutions, and 15 riots in a four year period (from 1973 to 1976). 
Focusing on Latin America will allow me to choose region specific determinants of 
instability and also to say something important about the ways in which policymakers 
could reduce instability in the future.
3
  
 To investigate the reasons behind Latin America’s instability, I first construct a 
composite measure of instability that is the first principal component of nine different 
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variables, including assassinations, coups, government crises, anti-government 
demonstrations, riots, strikes, purges, guerrilla activity, and revolutions. Given the 
difficulty in representing instability with just one variable, I believe using the first 
principal component is the best way to find the single most important common element 
within the nine underlying variables. 
 I find three important results. First, regime type is a significant determinant of 
instability. Countries with higher democracy scores have lower average political 
instability, which indicates that recent moves to increased democracy in the region may 
bring about less instability in the future. I experiment with alternative measures of 
democracy and show that this result is robust. In addition, estimates show that 
factionalized political parties experience higher average levels of political instability. 
 Second, I find that income inequality, urban growth, and ethnic fractionalization 
have significant nonlinear effects on instability. Specifically, I show that increases in 
income inequality raise instability up to a point, after which any further increases lower 
instability. Ethnic fractionalization and urbanization have the opposite effect, whereby 
initial increases in either decreases instability up to a point, after which any further 
increases produce higher levels of instability. Not only are these results important in 
themselves, but the fact that they have nonlinear relationships with instability may help 
to explain the lack of agreement in the literature over their role.  
 Third, most of the macroeconomic variables included in this estimation 
(including the standard deviation of inflation, investment share, and government budget 
deficit) are insignificantly related to instability. Only lagged values of trade openness 
have a significant and negative effect on instability.  
 3 
Section 1.2 discusses why it is difficult to measure political instability and 
makes the argument that principal component analysis (PCA) is an efficient way to 
capture its multi-dimensionality. I go on to show that this measure of instability reflects 
real world instability in Argentina, Mexico, and Costa Rica. Section 1.3 investigates the 
determinants of instability, while Section 1.4 discusses the results of the estimation. 
Section 1.5 discusses the results of estimating the model with different measures of 
democracy, and Section 1.6 concludes with a discussion of the policy implications of 
my findings. 
1.2 Measuring Political Instability 
There is little agreement in the empirical literature about how to best measure 
instability. Some papers narrow the definition of instability to mean simply turnover in 
the executive branch (or propensity of government change). For instance, Cukierman et 
al. (1992) estimate a probit model of instability where the dependent variable is the 
number of government changes (both regular and irregular). They test whether variables 
such as riots, repressions, executive adjustments, attempts to change the government, 
and years from previous government change can determine political turnover. Similarly, 
Alesina et al. (1996) estimate a binary model of government change for a larger sample 
of countries (113 countries from 1950 to 1982).
4
  
Much other work on instability expand the definition of instability to include 
phenomena such as civil wars, riots, assassinations, coups, and anti-government 
demonstrations, all of which can negatively affect property rights and deter new 
investment. The problem with broadening the definition of instability is that it becomes 




Hibbs (1973) used PCA decades ago to tackle the multi-dimensionality of 
political instability, a practice which was revived by Alesina and Perotti (1996). Alesina 
and Perotti (1996) and Perotti (1996) use the first principal component of 
assassinations, deaths, coups, and dictatorships to construct an index of political 
instability. Since then, most of the empirical literature on instability has followed their 
lead and utilized PCA (Annett, 2000; Campos and Nugent, 2003; Schatzman, 2005).
6
 
My dependent variable is the first principal component of nine different 
indicators of instability: assassinations, coups, government crises, anti-government 
demonstrations, riots, strikes, purges, guerrilla activity, and revolutions.
7
 All of these 
variables are important, but imperfect, manifestations of political instability. That is, 
there is no one variable that clearly captures all dimensions of instability. For instance, 
choosing coups as one’s measure would mean that Argentina would be considered 
relatively stable from 1973 to 1975 because of a lack of coups during this period. In 
reality (which I discuss in more detail below), those years were some of the most 
unstable in Argentina’s history and included deadly guerrilla wars, revolutions, and 
assassinations.  
The first principal component represents the element which explains the largest 
amount of variance in the data. In this case, the first principal component explains 32 
percent of the variance of instability, which is within the range that Alesina and Perotti 
(1996) report (between 30 and 40 percent). For ease of interpretation, I multiply this 





Table 1.1 shows the average values of the index of instability for the individual 
countries in my sample. Based on this measure, the four most unstable countries are 
Argentina, Peru, Bolivia, and Guatemala, whereas the four most stable are Costa Rica, 
Paraguay, the Dominican Republic, and Panama. The unstable group had 706 events of 
instability during the sample, while the stable group experienced only 182 events of 
instability. The differential was especially great in the case of assassinations and 
guerrilla warfare. The unstable group had a total of 183 assassinations during the 
sample period and 56 instances of guerrilla warfare, while the stable group experienced 
a sum of 10 assassinations and two instances of guerrilla warfare.  
 Before continuing to the empirical portion of the paper, I first want to check 
whether my measure of political instability accurately reflects what actually took place 
in these countries. Figures 1.1 to 1.3 show the evolution of the instability measure for 
Costa Rica, Mexico, and Argentina. I selected Costa Rica and Argentina because they 
represent the two extremes of instability. Mexico is included to show an intermediate 
case, where most of the sample is relatively stable with only a few periods of marked 
instability. 
 Figure 1.1 shows that the measure of political instability is nearly flat in the 
Costa Rican case. For Costa Rica, my instability measure becomes slightly positive in 
1991, when there were a few strikes and demonstrations, but for the rest of the sample it 
remains negative. This is consistent with what we know of Costa Rica, which has no 
military (and thus no possibility of a military coup) and has long been Latin America’s 
most stable country.  
 6 
Figure 1.2 plots the evolution of Mexican instability, indicating that the country 
was relatively stable up until the 1994 and 1995 period, after which instability moves 
around but is consistently above zero. This was a difficult period, both economically 
and socially, for Mexico. The Zapatistas took center stage in 1994 by staging an 
uprising in the southern state of Chiapas and the adoption of NAFTA and market 
oriented policies led to mass protests. The Peso crisis also occurred at the end of 1994, 
causing an economic crisis and subsequent recession. My measure of instability does a 
good job reflecting the increased instability during this period. 
The Argentine case is considerably more volatile. Figure 1.3 shows five separate 
periods of high instability in Argentina, with the first two being the most severe. In fact, 
the instability measure reaches a maximum of 8.51 in1974, which is also the sample 
maximum. The return of Juan Perón in 1973 to Argentina after an 18 year exile 
exacerbated the divisions in the Peronist Party and sparked a four year period of 
escalating instability. At his arrival at the international airport in Buenos Aires (Ezeiza), 
the right wing group, knowing that most of Peron’s airport supporters were from the 
leftist side, opened fire on the crowd. The Ezeiza massacre began a period of increasing 
guerrilla warfare between the two factions and frequent executive turnover (the country 
had four different presidents in the four year period). This period is represented in 
Figure 1.3 by the first shaded area.
9
  
 Argentina was under military rule from 1976 to 1983, but by the time 1981 
came around, the generals were rapidly losing support.
10
 There were large scale strikes 
in 1981 and 1982 and three separate crises which threatened to bring down the 
government. The large losses and embarrassing defeat in the Falkland Islands destroyed 
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any remaining credibility. The measure of instability seems consistent with this story, 
showing a large spike of instability around 1982 (the year of the Falkland Island 




1.3 An Empirical Model of Political Instability  
 In the paragraphs below, I discuss the independent variables I use to understand 
instability in the region. Table 1.3 provides a more detailed description of all the 
variables used in the estimation and their sources, while Table 1.4 provides summary 
statistics. All of the data is averaged into five year periods, allowing me to capture 
information from both average cross country differences and fluctuations over time.
12
  
A. Democracy, Factionalism, and Regime Duration 
Many studies highlight the importance of regime type to political stability. 
Ellingsen (2000) and Parsa (2003) argue that democratic regimes tend to experience less 
political instability than undemocratic regimes because they allow citizens to participate 
in the political process. By allowing political participation, violence will be less likely 
to arise in democratic regimes because conflict can be solved through voting and 
consensus (Rummel, 1995). Auvinen (1997) and Przeworski and Limongi (1997) also 
point out that democracies divert resources from investment to consumption, which 
allows democratic regimes to provide more economic and political goods, thus 
alleviating deprivation and discontent.  
Feng (1997), in a sample of 96 countries from 1960 to 1980, presents evidence 
of a positive relationship between democracy and stability. Schatzman (2005), on the 
other hand, finds mixed results in a sample of Latin American countries, depending on 
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the measure of stability. She finds that countries with more democratic regimes are less 
likely to experience collective protests, but more likely to experience rebellions. 
Goldstone et al. (2004) find that democracy is one of the most important factors behind 
political stability around the world, but go on to show that weak and factionalized 
democracies are some of the most unstable regime types. 
Factionalism has been associated with higher levels of instability because in a 
factionalized regime there is conflict inside the political parties.
13
 According to Benton 
(2007, p. 58), factions inside a political party can be based on “personal, cultural, socio-
economic, regional, or ideological cleavages.” In Latin America, factionalized regimes 
have tended to promote the development of clientelist networks and patronage 
politics.
14
 Benton (2007) argues that political parties in Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, 
Ecuador, Peru, Argentina, Costa Rica, Honduras, and Venezuela have suffered 
significant internal divisions that have lead to conflict and party dissolution. 
To measure democracy, I construct five year averages of democracy with the 
DEMOC variable from the Polity IV Project (Marshall and Jaggers, 2003). DEMOC is 
equal to a country’s democracy score less its autocracy score. Since the two component 
scores range from zero to 10, DEMOC has a range of -10 and 10, where higher values 
represent stronger democracy.  
I also include two other regime measures. The first is a dummy variable that 
accounts for the presence of factionalism, where factionalism is defined by the Polity IV 
dataset as “polities with parochial or ethnic-based political factions that regularly 
compete for political influence in order to promote particularist agendas and favor 
group members to the detriment of common, secular, or cross-cutting agendas” 
 9 
(Marshall and Jaggers, 2002, p.26).
15
 I take the average factional score for each five 
year period as a measure of particularist politics. 
The second is a measure of regime durability and it is measured the year before 
each five year period. To control for the possibility that the duration of different regime 
types may have different effects on political instability, I include an interaction term of 
the duration of a regime and a dummy equal to one for democratic countries. Regime 
durability is defined as the number of years that a country has not undergone a 
significant regime change, defined by the Polity IV as a three point move in a country’s 
democracy score. I also interact this variable with a democracy dummy which is equal 
to one when DEMOC is greater than zero.  
B. Neighborhood Instability 
Political instability can be contagious since revolutionary groups and ideologies 
can cross borders. Countries in ‘bad neighborhoods’ might suffer from neighboring 
instability, especially if that instability causes a flood of refugees into the country or if 
guerrilla armies use a country as a base from which to attack their home country. 
Goldstone et al. (2004) find that countries with four or more political unstable neighbors 
are more likely to experience political instability, while Schatzman (2005) finds that 
political instability in neighboring countries increases the probability of a country 
experiencing collective protests.
16
 I create a variable that is equal to the number of 
neighbor countries that experienced political instability during each five year period. I 
follow Goldstone et al.’s (2004) approach and consider a country as politically unstable 
if there was either an ethnic conflict or a revolutionary war during the year, since these 
are the types of instability that are most likely to affect neighboring countries. In the 
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sample period, there are two main blocs of ‘bad neighborhoods’: the first includes 
Guatemala, El Salvador, and Nicaragua; the second includes Colombia and Peru.  
C. Inequality 
Eckstein and Wickham-Crowley (2003) and Oxhorn (2003) provide evidence 
that the increase in democracy in Latin America has come without an improvement in 
the distribution of income, and that income disparity may be threatening stability in the 
region. Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) develop a theoretical model of democracy and 
income inequality and argue that high income inequality in Latin America is one of the 
main causes of weak democracy in the region. Elites will be against democracy in 
highly unequal societies because a democratic system will impose more redistributive 
policies.
17
 Empirically, Alesina and Perotti (1996), Perotti (1996), and Odedokun and 




To determine whether income inequality has a nonlinear effect on political 
instability, I include in the estimation a country’s average Gini coefficient (from 1971 to 
2000) and its square. The most unequal countries in the region are Guatemala, Peru, the 
Dominican Republic, and Bolivia, while the least unequal are Paraguay, Costa Rica, 
Uruguay, and Nicaragua. Except for the Dominican Republic, all of the highly unequal 
countries are also highly unstable. Likewise, two of the most politically stable countries 
have the least amount of income inequality (Costa Rica and Paraguay). 
D. Other Socio-Demographic Conditions 
Other variables, such as ethnic fractionalization, economic discrimination of 




Ellingsen (2000), Auvinen and Nafziger (2002), and Goldstone et al. (2005) claim that 
economic discrimination of ethnic minorities can lead to political instability if 
discriminated groups rebel against the system. Empirically, Annett (2000), Ellingsen 
(2000), and Collier and Hoeffler (2004) show that ethnic fractionalization has a positive 
and significant effect on instability levels.
20
  
  While urbanization has also been considered in explanation of political 
instability, there is no consensus on how urban growth affects political instability. 
Collier and Hoeffler (2004) argue that the rate of urbanization is low during periods of 
instability, and that this negative relationship is due to the fact that a government has 
better military capability in a highly urbanized country. A highly dispersed population 
makes it difficult for the government to contain instability. On the other hand, Auvinen 
(1997) and Annett (2000) argue that urbanization tends to promote more political 
instability. High urban growth promotes more instability because it is difficult for the 
government to provide basic services in highly populated cities, which creates popular 
discontent.  
 To investigate the effect of these socio-economic factors on instability, I include 
the number of years of the five year period in which there is at least one group that 
experiences economic discrimination and the ethnic fractionalization index (and its 
square). Since the literature on urbanization and stability is still unsettled, I test whether 
it is possible that urbanization has a nonlinear effect on instability. Perhaps initial 
urbanization is good for stability, while high levels create citizen discontent and thus 
more instability. To study this, I include in my estimation a country’s average urban 
growth and its square for each five year period.  
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E. Macroeconomic Factors 
Poor economic performance has been considered as a major cause of political 
instability for two reasons. First, when income is low (or falling), the opportunity cost 
for an individual to rise up, protest, or revolt is low (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004). Under 
this situation, individuals have an incentive to quit their participation in productive 
activities and take part in protests and insurrections (Grossman, 1991). Second, poor 
economic conditions increase deprivation, which will fuel political instability as citizens 
perceive their government to be incompetent (Posner, 1997; Auvinen and Nafziger, 
1999; and Ellingsen, 2000).
21
 Empirically, Cuzan et al. (1988), Booth (1991), Annett 




Many papers study the effect of political instability on inflation rates, but few 
have investigated the possibility that high (or volatile) inflation may destabilize polities. 
Cukierman et al. (1992) find in a sample of 79 countries that politically weak 
governments are more likely to resort to seignorage. Paldam (1987) focuses on eight 
Latin American countries from 1946 to 1983 and shows that the causality between 
inflation and instability works both ways. He goes on to demonstrate that almost no 
regime in the region has survived a bout of hyperinflation, a trend that still holds in the 
region. Of the countries with the highest and most volatile inflations, almost all were 
forced out of power.  
 Besides inflation itself, government spending may be a stabilizing or 
destabilizing factor, depending on how the spending is financed. Annett (2000) finds 
that an increase in government spending is associated with lower levels of political 
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instability, while Cuzan et al. (1988) find that an increase in government spending 
increases political instability in Latin American countries.  
 Lastly, Donovan et al. (2005) and Goldstone et al. (2005) discuss the possibility 
that trade openness might have an effect on political instability. Goldstone et al. (2005, 
p. 26) note that “countries with lower trade openness (at the 25
th
 percentile in the global 
distribution) had roughly two to three times higher odds of near term instability than 
countries with higher openness to trade (those at the 75
th
 percentile).” Donovan et al. 
(2005) argue that trade openness may be negatively associated with instability if 
openness brings about more economic growth.  
To investigate the effects of macroeconomic variables on instability in the 
region, I include the share of investment as a percentage of GDP, the standard deviation 
of inflation (as a measure of inflation volatility), the share of the government budget 
deficit as a percentage of GDP, and openness to trade. All of these variables are 
constructed in five year averages. However, since there may be a reverse causality issue 
between them and political instability, I use the first lag in each case.  
1.4 Results 
 In this section I estimate a model of political instability using the composite 
measure of instability and the independent variables discussed above. Unless otherwise 
noted, all of the data is averaged over five year periods, which gives six observations 
per country and a total of 108 observations. All regressions are estimated with ordinary 
least squares with White robust standard errors.  
 Column 1 of Table 1.5 presents my results and shows that the model explains 48 
percent of the variation in the instability index. One of the most interesting results from 
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column 1 is that regime type significantly affects instability levels in the region. The 
coefficient on the measure of democracy, DEMOC, is negative and significant at the 1 
percent level, meaning that countries with higher levels of democracy in the five year 
period have lower levels of instability on average. The quantitative effect of democracy, 
however, is not large: a one standard deviation increase in DEMOC (equal to 6.09 
points in the index) is associated with a 0.43 point decrease in the political instability 
index (which is equal to about one third of a standard deviation of political instability). 
 The coefficient on the factional dummy is positive and significant at the 1 
percent level, supporting Goldstone et al.'s (2005) findings that factionalized political 
regimes are also more unstable on average. The quantitative effect of factionalism on 
instability is larger than the effect of the DEMOC variable, but it is still small. A one 
standard deviation increase in factionalism (equal to 0.36) is associated with a 0.53 
point increase in the political instability index. The coefficients on durability and the 
interaction between durability and democracy are both insignificantly different from 
zero, implying that whether a country was a stable democracy or a stable autocracy in 
the previous five year has no significant effect on contemporary levels of instability.  
 I also find no evidence of regional contagion in the region. The coefficient on 
neighborhoods is insignificantly different from zero. The coefficient on the variable 
representing economic discrimination of minorities is likewise insignificant. I do find, 
however, that overall ethnic diversity matters for instability. The ethnic fractionalization 
index has a significant negative effect on instability at the 5 percent level, while the 
square of this index has a significant positive effect on political instability at the 1 
percent level. Figure 1.4 graphs the nonlinear relationship between ethnic diversity and 
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instability that I find. Increases in diversity lower instability until the fractionalization 
index reaches 0.33, at which point any further ethnic diversity increases average 
instability levels. Ethnic diversity in my sample ranges from 0.17 (Paraguay) to 0.74 
(Bolivia), but the majority of the countries have diversity levels greater than the turning 
point (this high diversity group includes Bolivia, Brazil, Colombia, the Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Honduras, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Peru, and 
Venezuela).  
 Income inequality also has an important nonlinear effect on instability in the 
region. The coefficient on the inequality variable is positive and significant at the 1 
percent level, while the square of the variable is negative and significant at the 1 percent 
level. These results indicate that inequality raises instability until the Gini coefficient 
reaches 0.45, at which point any further increases will be negatively associated with 
instability. This finding supports Acemoglu and Robinson's (2006) claim that the effect 




Lastly, on the socio-demographic factors, the results in column 1 show that 
urban growth has a nonlinear effect on instability. The coefficient on the urban growth 
is negative and significant at the 1 percent level while its square is positive and 
significant at the 5 percent level. The finding of a nonlinear relationship between the 
two is especially interesting since there are two contrasting views in the literature on 
urbanization and instability. Increased urban growth increases average stability until the 
rate reaches 13.6 percent, at which point any further increases in urbanization will bring 
about more instability. All of the countries have rates to the left of this rate, except for 
 16 
Nicaragua from 1996 to 2000, when the rate of urbanization grew by 18 percent.
24
 This 
finding provides support for the argument that urbanization can help to promote 
political stability (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004). Specifically, I find that one standard 
deviation increase in the urban growth rate (equal to 3.243) is associated with a drop in 
the political instability index of 0.45 points. 
Of the different macroeconomic variables discussed in the previous section, only 
trade openness is consistently significant. Neither the level nor the standard deviation of 
inflation are statistically significant (I report only the results of using the standard 
deviation for reasons of space), nor is government deficit share or investment as a 
percentage of GDP. Trade openness is negative and significant at the 1 percent level, 
indicating that an increase in openness by one standard deviation in the previous five 
year period is associated with a 0.35 point decrease in the instability index. This result 
mirrors Goldstone et al.'s (2005) finding of a negative relationship between openness 
and instability for Sub-Saharan Africa. 
 In column 2 of Table 1.5 I re-estimate the model and exclude the variables that 
are not significant at least at the 5 percent level (regime durability, neighborhood 
conflict, economic discrimination, the standard deviation of inflation, investment, and 
the government deficit share).
25
 The signs and statistical significance of the remaining 
variables are very similar to that of column 1. The only exceptions are that the 
coefficient on ethnic fractionalization is now significant at the 1 percent level and the 




1.5 Alternative Measures of Democracy 
 For robustness purposes, I re-estimate the restricted model using two different 
measures of democracy. First, I re-define democracy as the five year average of the 
democracy score (called DEMOC2) provided by the Polity IV data set. The variable 
ranges from zero to 10 and it measures the degree of openness of political institutions. 
Like the DEMOC variable, higher values of this score are associated with higher levels 
of democracy. Column 1 of Table 1.6 shows the estimates when using this new measure 
of democracy. The coefficient on the democracy score indicates that an increase on 
democracy of one standard deviation (equal to 3.54) is associated with a decrease in the 
political instability index between 0.32 point, which is somewhat less than the estimate 
when I use the polity score (DEMOC) as a measure of democracy. The sign and 
significance of the other variables in the estimation remain the same.  
 I also test for the possibility that the relationship between democracy and 
instability is not linear (and should not be entered as a cardinal value). For example, 
moving from a negative one to zero on the DEMOC index may have much greater 
implications for instability than moving from nine to a 10. To investigate this 
possibility, I create a dummy variable for high democracy that is equal to one if a 
country’s five year DEMOC average is greater than zero. Column 2 of Table 1.6 
presents the results of including the high democracy dummy in the estimation. The 
coefficient on the dummy is negative and significant at the 1 percent level, indicating 
that countries with high levels of democracy have lower average instability. The signs 
and significance levels of the other independent variables remain the same. In sum, 
 18 
democracy is a significant indicator of instability and is robust to several alternative 
specifications. 
1.6 Discussion 
Latin America has a long history of political instability. Any attempt to change 
this path requires policymakers to have a good understanding of the reasons behind this 
persistent instability. I try to improve our understanding of this instability by studying 
18 Latin American countries. Using a broad composite measure of instability, I test 
whether variables such as regime type, regime durability, factionalism, income 
inequality, ethnic diversity, ethnic discrimination, regional spillover effects, urban 
growth, and a host of macroeconomic variables matter for regional instability. 
 I find several interesting results. First, I show that democracy is strongly 
associated with political stability. Countries with strong democratic regimes suffer less 
political instability on average, a finding which is robust to several different measures 
of democracy. In addition, I find that factionalized political regimes tend to experience 
higher average levels of instability. These findings highlight the need to establish 
institutions and policies which promote strong democracies in the region. More broad-
based political parties, ones which are not so divided on cultural, ethnic, or regional 
lines, would also help alleviate instability. 
 Second, I find that income inequality, ethnic fractionalization, and urbanization 
all have important nonlinear effects on instability. This finding is relevant since Latin 
America is one of the most unequal and ethnically diverse, regions of the world. It has 
also had very high rates of urbanization in the post World War II era. My results 
indicate that reducing income inequality can pay off in terms of less instability. While 
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the promotion of a more egalitarian society through taxation may not be politically 
feasible, policymakers could reduce inequality (and reduce the problems that may arise 
from high diversity) through educational reforms. Although high rates of urban growth 
have caused many problems for administrators, including increasing pressure on 
infrastructure and city services, results show that most urban growth in the sample 
reduced political instability. Only one country in the sample experienced a rate of 
urbanization that was high enough to bring about more instability.  
While researchers have posited the relevance of macroeconomic factors as 
determinants of instability, I find that the majority of the macroeconomic variables I 
studied were insignificant. The only macroeconomic factor that explains instability in 
Latin America significantly is openness to trade. I show that openness to trade is 
negatively and significantly associated with political instability. Although Latin 
American countries have already considerably decreased their barriers to international 
trade, these results suggest that further trade liberalization will promote stability in the 
region.  
 In conclusion, my analysis shows that regime type and socio-demographic 
conditions, not macroeconomic factors, matter most for regional stability. This finding 
is relevant not only because many have blamed instability on the poor economic 
performance of Latin American countries in the last decades, but also because it gives 
policymakers positive options, such as the strengthening of democracy and the 
reduction of inequality, to promote future stability. 




 There is a large literature on the effects of instability on economic development. See, for 
example, Hibbs (1973), Stewart and Venieris (1985), Alesina and Perotti (1996), Alesina et al. 
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(1996), Benhabib and Rustichini (1996), Edwards (1996), and Gyimah-Brempong and Traynor 




 Goldstone et al. (2005) ranks Latin America as the third most unstable region in the world in 
the post-war era. Table 1.1 lists the countries used in this sample.  
 
3
 While most of the work on understanding political instability does so with a wide sample of 
countries, it may not be appropriate to pool data from such dissimilar countries. Grier and 
Tullock (1989) and Block (2001) illustrate the importance of testing the validity of pooling data 
from large samples of countries together in a single equation. They both show that the 
coefficients in a growth equation are significantly different across different sub-samples and 
cannot be appropriately pooled.  
 
4
 See also Chen and Feng (1996), Feng (1997), and Svensson (1998). 
 
5
 Some early papers chose to measure instability along a single dimension with variables like 
the number of coups or revolutions (Londregan and Poole, 1990; Barro, 1991). Others, such as 
Auvinen (1997), Posner (1997), Ellingsen (2000), and Bloomberg and Hess (2002), recognize 
instability’s multi-dimensionality by estimating models sequentially with separate measures. 
Nel (2003) constructs an aggregate index that sums the number of coups, civil war, riots, and 
revolutions for each country, while Goldstone et al. (2005) consider a country unstable if it 
experiences either an adverse regime change, ethnic conflict, revolutionary war, or genocide 
during the period studied. 
 
6
 See Kim and Mueller (1982) for a good overview of PCA. 
 
7
 Broadly speaking, these nine variables can be classified into three different types of events: 
those that pose a major threat to the political and economic system (coups, revolutions, and 
government crises), those that reveal citizen discontent with the political system (strikes, riots, 
and anti-government demonstrations), and those characterized by extreme violence either by 
opposition elements or by the government (guerrilla warfare, assassinations, and purges. Table 
1.2 provides a detailed definition of these components.  
 
8
 The factor weightings indicate that all of the component variables contribute to the index, with 
the highest weights on revolutions, guerrilla activity, and assassinations. 
 
9
 Sturzenegger (1991) argues that that the persistent upheaval and violence made people lose 




 The economic situation was dire, with inflation reaching more than 450 percent, and labor 
unions began to assert themselves again (Andersen, 1984, p. 157). Munck (1992, p. 205) notes 
that while the military was trying to engage the opposition in dialogue, by 1982 it was clear that 
they had lost control of the process. 
 
11
 The other three periods of Argentine instability occur under democratic regimes and consist 
more of demonstrations and strikes instead of guerrilla wars, military coups, and revolutions. 
There were large social protests at the end of President Raul Alfonsín’s tenure in 1989, forcing 
him to step down six months early. The instability measure shows a spike in instability in 1988 
 21 
                                                                                                                                               
and 1989 which is consistent with this. Likewise, there were strikes and protests in the mid 
1990s and again in 2000 against increasing economic problems which is reflected in Figure 3.  
 
12
 See Grier and Tullock (1989) for a justification of using five year intervals instead of 
averaging over long periods. 
 
13
 Benton (2007) develops a theoretical model of why Latin American regimes are factionalized. 
She argues that there are subgroups inside political parties that fight for power and resources. 
Her paper presents a good overview on how factionalism matters for overall instability. 
 
14
 Factions are “coalitions used by politicians to bolster careers” (Benton, 1997, p. 62). See 
Benton (2007, p. 56) for concrete examples of political party factionalism in Latin American. 
 
15
 According to the Polity IV, factional regimes also must have the following electoral 
participation characteristics: “There are relatively stable and enduring political groups which 
compete for political influence at the national level–parties, regional groups, or ethnic groups, 
not necessarily elected–but there are few, recognized overlapping (common) interests” 
(Marshall and Jaggers, 2002, p. 25). 
 
16
 On the other hand, she finds that regional instability decreases the probability of rebellions in 
the domestic country.  
 
17
 In addition, Perotti (1996) and Auvinen and Nafziger (2002) argue that an unequal 
distribution of income can produce social discontent if individuals perceive that income is 
unfairly distributed and rebel against the system. Eckstein and Wickham-Crawley (2003), 
Oxhorn (2003), and Parsa (2003) also argue that high income inequality in Latin America 
promotes political instability in the region. 
  
18
 However, in a sample restricted to Sub-Saharan countries, Nel (2003) finds that income 
inequality has a significant effect on investors’ perceptions about the political environment but 
not a significant effect on political instability. 
 
19
 Alesina and Perotti (1996) also use primary school enrollment rates as an explanatory 
variable of political instability and find that education has a significant negative effect on 
political instability. Collier and Hoeffler (2004) use the male secondary enrollment rate as an 
explanatory variable, arguing that the variable reflects the opportunity cost of rebellion. I do not 
include education in my estimation because I found no significant relationship between it and 
political instability in any of the estimations.  
 
20
 Easterly and Levine (1997) use ethnic fractionalization as an explanatory variable of political 
instability but find that it is not significant. Auvinen and Nafziger (2002), however, caution that 
ethnic fractionalization is not a sufficient condition for political instability since ethnic 
antagonism does not necessarily exist in highly factionalized societies.  
 
21
 Goldstone et al. (2005) use infant mortality as a measure of the standard of living and find 
that this variable is one of the best overall predictors of political instability around the world. 
 
22
 I do not report the results of including infant mortality or income levels in my model because 
I found that they have no significant effect.  
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23
 Caution should be used when interpreting these results, however, because the countries in the 
sample have very similar levels of inequality. For instance, the least unequal country in the 
sample (Paraguay) has a Gini coefficient of 0.41 while the most unequal countries (Peru and 
Guatemala) have a coefficient of 0.48. If a country were to move from being the most unequal 
to the least unequal, the effect on instability would be very small and actually negative (a 
decrease in the instability index of about 0.008). 
 
24
 Some countries had urban growth rates that were close to the turning point, including the 




 I perform an F test and find that I cannot reject at the 5 percent level the hypothesis that these 
variables as a group do not explain significantly political instability. 
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Argentina  1.232 1 218 1 
Peru  0.94 2 157 4 
Bolivia  0.763 3 136 7 
Guatemala  0.618 4 195 2 
Colombia  0.444 5 168 3 
Chile  0.18 6 155 5 
El Salvador  0.177 7 154 6 
Nicaragua  -0.197 8 94 9 
Ecuador  -0.215 9 86 10 
Mexico  -0.233 10 119 8 
Brazil  -0.732 11 81 11 
Honduras  -0.764 12 72 13 
Venezuela  -0.779 13 65 14 
Uruguay  -0.863 14 58 16 
Panama  -0.908 15 58 15 
Dom. Rep. -0.913 16 72 12 
Paraguay  -1.299 17 36 17 
Costa Rica  -1.63 18 16 18 
 
*Political instability refers to the average from 1971 to 2000 of the first principal 
component of assassinations, coups, government crises, anti-government 
demonstrations, riots, strikes, purges, guerrilla activity, and revolutions. The number is 
multiplied by minus one to make increases in the variable represent higher instability. 
 
**This is the total number of assassinations, coups, government crises, anti-government 
demonstrations, riots, strikes, purges, guerrilla activity, and revolutions that occurred in 
each country from 1971 to 2000. 
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Table 1.2 Description of the Components of Instability 
 
Variable Defined by the Cross-National Time Series Data Archive As: 
 
Coup d’etat  
 
 
“The number of extra-constitutional or forced changes in the top 
government elite and/or its effective control of the nation's power 
structure in a given year. The term ‘coup’ includes, but is not 
exhausted by, the term ‘successful revolution’. Unsuccessful 





“Any rapidly developing situation that threatens to bring the 
downfall of the present regime - excluding situations of revolt 




“Any illegal or forced change in the top governmental elite, any 
attempt at such a change, or any successful or unsuccessful armed 






“Any peaceful public gathering of at least 100 people for the 
primary purpose of displaying or voicing their opposition to 
government policies or authority, excluding demonstrations of a 




“Any violent demonstration or clash of more than 100 citizens 
involving the use of physical force.”  
 
General Strike  
 
“Any strike of 1,000 or more industrial or service workers that 
involves more than one employer and that is aimed at national 
government policies or authority.”  
 
Guerrilla Warfare  
 
“Any armed activity, sabotage, or bombings carried on by 
independent bands of citizens or irregular forces and aimed at the 




“Any systematic elimination by jailing or execution of political 




“Any politically motivated murder or attempted murder of a high 
government official or politician.”  
 
Source: Cross National Time Series Data (Banks, 2005) 
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Average Gini coefficient 
 
Average Gini coefficient from 1971 to 2000 
(average constructed with the available 
observations for each country). Source: University 
of Texas Inequality Project (Galbraith and Kum, 
2004). 
 
Democracy Combined polity score (DEMOC) computed by 
subtracting the autocracy score from the democracy 
score. Source: Polity IV Project (Marshall and 
Jaggers, 2003). 
 
Economic discrimination Number of years in the 5 year period that a country 
has had state-led economic discrimination against 
at least one group, measured as a 4 on the economic 
discrimination index. Source: Minority at Risk 
Dataset (Wilkenfeld, 2004). 
 
Ethnic fractionalization Ethnic fractionalization index. Source: Alesina et. 
al. (2003). 
 
Factionalism Political competition score (POLCOMP) that 
combines the regulation and competitiveness of 
participation scores. Source: Polity IV Project 
(Marshall and Jaggers, 2003). 
 
Government budget deficit as a 
share of GDP 
The percentage of government budget in nominal 
prices (government expenditure minus government 
revenue). Source: Oxford Latin American 
Economic History Database. 
 
Inflation  The level and standard deviation of inflation in the 
5 year period. Inflation calculated using the GDP 
deflator. Source: World Development Indicators 
(World Bank, 2005). 
 
Investment share of GDP The percentage of GDP that comes from 
investment. Source: Penn World Tables 6.2 (Heston 










Number of neighbour countries that experienced 
either an ethnic conflict or a revolutionary war. 
Source: Political Instability Task Force Dataset 
(Goldstone et al., 2005). 
 
Regime durability Number of years a country has had a particular 
regime (durable). Source: Polity IV Dataset 
(Marshall and Jaggers, 2003). 
 
Trade openness Openness is equal to exports plus imports divided 
by real GDP (Laspeyres method). Source: Penn 
World Tables 6.2 (Heston et al., 2002). 
 
Urban population growth Growth of the percentage of the total population 
that live in urban areas. Source: Oxford Latin 
American Economic History Database. 
 
Democracy (alternative measure) Democracy score (DEMOC2) measures the 
general openness of political institutions. Source: 
Polity IV Project (Marshall and Jaggers, 2003). 
 
High democracy dummy High democracy is equal to one if the 5 year 




Table 1.4 Summary Statistics 
 
   Mean  Median  Std. Dev. 
Average Gini coefficient 44.846 45.031 2.488 
Democracy (DEMOC) 2.806 5.800 6.087 
Democracy (DEMOC2) 4.955 6.000 3.537 
Economic discrimination 1.509 0.000 2.177 
Ethnic discrimination 0.427 0.491 0.187 
Factionalism 0.204 0.000 0.360 
Government deficit share -0.299 -0.014 2.838 
High democracy dummy 0.64 1.00 0.48 
Investment share 14.911 14.556 5.407 
Low democracy dummy 0.36  0.00 0.48 
Neighborhood conflict 0.667 1.000 0.749 
Openness 48.005 39.282 35.707 
Political instability index -0.232 -0.662 1.336 
Regime durability 12.685 6.500 16.133 
Standard deviation of inflation 195.825 8.593 808.505 
Urbanization 5.013 4.124 3.243 
All variables have 108 observations 
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Table 1.5 A Model of Political Instability 
 
  1 2 
Constant  -123.3 -94.9 












 (2.8) (3.5) 
Regime durability 0.002  --- 
 (0.2)  
Regime durability * democracy dummy 0.008 --- 
 (1.0)  
Neighbourhood conflict 0.04 --- 














 (4.0) (2.9) 
Economic discrimination 0.03 --- 




























 (2.4) (1.9) 




Investment share t-1 -0.03 --- 
 (0.8)  
Government deficit share t-1 0.03 --- 
 (1.4)  





 (2.4) (2.4) 
R-squared 0.48 0.44 
Observations 108 108 
t-statistics in parentheses use White’s robust standard errors. a, b, and c represent  
statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively. 
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Table 1.6 A Model of Political Instability with Different Measures of 
Democracy 
 
  1 2 
Constant -91.4 -93.7 




 (9.9)  
High democracy dummy  --- -0.76
 a
 


































 (5.3) (3.5) 













 (1.9) (1.7) 








   
   
R-squared 0.44 0.44 
Observations 108 108 
t-statistics in parentheses use White’s robust standard errors. a, b, and c represent      
statistical significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively. 
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The Finance-Growth Link in Latin America 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 During the 1980s, most Latin American countries suffered from distorted 
financial systems. In this decade the government kept interest rate controls, allocated 
credit arbitrarily, and deterred the expansion of securities markets and the creation of 
new financial institutions (Edwards, 1999). Even though Latin American countries 
experienced significant financial reforms in the 1990s that promoted financial 
deregulation and the expansion of the stock market, financial development indicators 
show that the region still financially underdeveloped.
1
 Credit to the private sector as a 
share of GDP in the 2000s reached 30 percent in Latin America, which is double the 
size of what this region had in the 1960s, but only one half the size of East Asian credit 
markets (Galindo et al., 2007). Therefore, lack of financial depth may be a barrier to 
better economic performance in Latin America.  
 The link between financial development and economic growth is complex since 
the direction of causation between the two variables may run both directions. 
Theoretical and empirical analyses support the positive effects of financial development 
on economic growth, and there is evidence that countries with high GDP per capita tend 
to have more developed financial systems. Therefore, it is important for policymakers in 
Latin America to determine whether financial development leads to economic growth. 
In this paper, I analyze the relationship between financial development and economic 
growth in Latin America. 
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 There is a vast literature on the analysis of the relationship between financial 
development and economic growth, but few empirical analyses pool countries from a 
single region. Pooling only Latin American countries in the analysis is appropriate since 
empirical evidence has shown that the effect of financial development on economic 
growth varies across countries and that not all countries can be pooled in to the same 
sample.
2
 In this paper, I use a sample of 13 Latin American countries from 1961 to 2004 
to determine the way of causation between financial development and economic 
growth. The indicators of financial development used are private credit and liquid 
liabilities as a share of GDP.  
 Using bivariate and multivariate vector autoregression (VAR) models, I find two 
way causality between financial development and economic growth for the full sample. 
Nonetheless, I find that the two way causation does not hold once the sample is divided 
by initial levels of income. The two way causation holds only for those countries with 
higher initial income levels. For those countries with lower initial income levels, 
evidence shows that financial development follows economic growth. There is no 
evidence that financial development causes economic growth for the lower income 
group. These results are relevant not only because they provide evidence supporting one 
side of the debate on the finance-growth relationship, but also an insight on the real 
effects of financial reforms in Latin America.  
To summarize, the main objective of my analysis is to determine whether 
financial development causes economic growth in Latin America. This analysis also 
explores whether the direction of causality is different across countries with different 
income levels. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In section 2.2, I present a 
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review of the literature on the relationship of financial development and economic 
growth and an overview on financial development in Latin America. Section 2.3 
describes the data; Section 2.4 outlines the model specification; Section V presents the 
empirical results; and Section 2.5 concludes. 
2.2 The Finance–Growth Link and the Latin American Case 
A. Financial Development and Economic Growth 
The level of financial development in a country is determined by the access that 
individuals have to credit and financial services. The primary function of the financial 
sector is to “facilitate the allocation of resources across space and time in an uncertain 
environment” (Levine, 1997, p. 691). Financial development also decreases market 
frictions that result from imperfect information by connecting savers with investors in 
an efficient way and by allocating resources to profitable projects (Demirguc-Kunt, 
2006). Therefore, the financial sector plays a crucial role in the economy because any 
entrepreneurial and trading activity will depend on it. An efficient financial sector will 
lead to higher economic growth because it provides relevant information for savers and 
investors, monitors investment projects, promotes risk diversification, and increases the 
amount of transactions in the economy (Levine, 2005). The financial sector has also 
been considered relevant for the development of technology and the accumulation of 
physical capital (King and Levine, 1993).    
A country is considered financially developed if it has a large financial sector 
that successfully connects savers with investors (Beck et al., 2001). In the empirical 
literature, financial development has been measured using private credit issued by 
deposit money banks and other institutions as a share of GDP. Private credit not only 
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reveals the ability of the financial sector to reach businesses and to allocate resources to 
profitable projects, but also accounts for credits allocated only through private 
institutions to the private sector (Beck et al., 2000a). An alternative measure of financial 
depth commonly used is liquid liabilities as a share of GDP. Liquid liabilities is the 
addition of currency and interest bearing liabilities of financial intermediaries and non-
bank financial intermediaries as a share of GDP.        
There is a debate about the relationship between financial development and 
economic growth, with some arguing that financial development causes economic 
growth, while others assert that economic growth causes financial development. 
Supporters of the positive effect of financial development on economic growth state that 
the characteristics of the financial sector are relevant for economic activity and base 
their argument on Schumpeter’s view of financial development as creative destruction 
(Rajan and Zingales, 2003). On the other hand, others argue that financial development 
may be the consequence of economic growth because developed economies create the 
demand for developed financial sectors (Shan, 2005). Empirical analyses on the 
relationship between financial development and economic growth use cross country, 
panel, and firm/industry data to support both sides of the debate.  
In a literature review on the relationship between financial development and 
economic growth, Levine (2005) concludes that causality runs from financial 
development to economic growth. The channels through which financial development 
positively effects economic growth are productivity and capital accumulation (Beck et 
al., 2000b). Financial development promotes the increase of technology because access 
to financial resources allows for labor specialization, which creates a virtuous cycle in 
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the economy (Saint-Paul, 1992). More efficient financial sectors are also associated 
with better resource allocation that leads to higher capital accumulation. 
Some empirical analyses recognize that financial development may be 
endogenous in the growth equation and address this. Beck et al. (2000b), Benhabib and 
Spiegel (2000), Khan and Senhadji (2000), Levine et al. (2000), and Loayza and 
Ranciere (2006) show that the exogenous component of financial development has a 
positive effect on economic growth. It has also been shown empirically that financial 
development has a positive effect on productivity and capital accumulation (King and 
Levine, 1993; Beck et al. 2000b; Nourzad, 2002; Rioja and Valev, 2004a).
3
 According 
to Aghion et al. (2005), by increasing productivity and capital accumulation, financial 
development helps income levels of less developed countries (LDCs) to converge to the 
income levels of developed countries (DCs). 
Analyses at the firm/industry level also support the argument that financial 
development is conducive to growth. It is argued that with a more developed financial 
system, manufacturing industries have a comparative advantage (Beck, 2002). For 
example, Rajan and Zingales (1998) show that financial development is beneficial to 
those industries that rely on external financing.
4
  Furthermore, Love (2003) has 
empirically shown that financial development reduces the cost of capital, and this 
allows firms to allocate investment more efficiently. 
Although there is an extensive amount of work that supports the argument that 
financial development is conducive to growth, others argue that financial development 
is just the consequence of economic growth or that the causality between the two is bi-
directional. As stated by Shan et al. (2001), the relationship between financial 
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development and economic growth may be a ‘chicken and the egg’ problem since 
financial institutions are usually developed in DCs and underdeveloped in LDCs. 
Greenwood and Jovanovic (1990) and Berthelemy and Varoudakis (1996) present 
theoretical explanations of the two way causation between financial development and 
economic growth. They argue that there is a virtuous cycle in developed economies 
since an expansion in the real sector leads to an increase in the demand for loanable 
funds, which leads to improvements in the financial sector. The empirical record is 
mixed. 
Empirical analyses have shown that the positive effect of financial development 
on growth does not hold for all countries, and that the effect of financial development 
on economic growth is significantly different in LDCs (Xu, 2000; Rioja and Valev, 
2004b).
5
 While Shan et al. (2001) and Shan (2005) find no evidence that financial 
development causes economic growth, others find bi-directional causality between 
financial development and economic growth (Berthelemy and Varoudakis, 1996; 
Demetriades and Hussein, 1996; Luintel and Khan, 1999).  
The debate on determining what comes first, financial development or economic 
growth, is far from being solved. Finding the direction of causation between financial 
development and economic growth in Latin America is necessary in order to determine 
whether further reforms to this sector are conducive to growth.  
B. The Latin American Case 
 In most Latin American countries, the financial sector is bank based and the 
stock market is small. In the 1990s, the average level of credit to the private sector in 
Latin America was only 28 percent of GDP, which is considerably smaller than that 
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found in other developing regions (e.g. 72 percent for Asia and 43 percent for countries 
in the Middle East and North Africa).
6
 Galindo et al. (2007) argue that, although the 
region has experienced a significant financial liberalization, the financial sector in Latin 
America has not been able to catch up with other emerging regions. 
  Evidence shows that the lack of financial depth has characterized the Latin 
American region since independence. In the early 1900s, capital markets were 
extremely weak and the banking system was very small (Bulmer-Thomas, 2003).
7
 The 
stagnation of capital markets during the late 1800s and early 1900s, made the sources of 
credit limited, and this led to a high concentration in the financial sector.
8
 The 
underdevelopment of the financial system in the region has been attributed to short term 
lending strategies and to the governments’ inability to pay back their debt. According to 
Levine (2000), another reason behind the underdevelopment of the financial sector in 
Latin America is the legal framework that lacks contract enforcement.
9
    
 The underdevelopment of the financial sector in Latin America today has also 
been attributed to financial repression throughout the 1970s and 1980s. During these 
decades, Latin American governments used the banking sector to finance their budget 
deficits with borrowing and implicit taxation. Governments also used the banking sector 
to subsidize sectoral development projects and this produced a “bias to refinance non-
performing loans,” that “benefited bad banks and especially bad borrowers” (Mas, 
1995; p. 695). Mas (1995) notes that it was not until the 1990 reforms that the banking 
sector experienced a significant change.   
It is argued that the structural reforms implemented in Latin America during the 
1990s have promoted the participation of the private sector in financial institutions 
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(Loayza and Palacios, 1997). However, Burki and Perri (1997) posit that these reforms 
did not make financial markets in Latin America more efficient. According to them, 
reforms in the future should focus on increasing competition, reducing government 
participation, developing efficient bond and equity markets, and promoting foreign 
participation. De la Torre et al. (2006) concur with this view and argue that reforms in 
the financial sector should focus on helping the small and medium enterprises.
10
 In a 
comprehensive analysis of financial reforms in Latin America in the last two decades, 
Galindo et al. (2007) conclude that other reforms, related to the legal framework, are 
required in order to further expand the financial sector in the region and to allow this 
sector to have a real effect in the economy. They argue that financial liberalization has 
not given the expected results because institutions in the region do not protect contracts 
and creditors’ rights.            
 There are few region-specific empirical studies on the relationship between 
financial development and economic growth, and especially for the Latin American 
region. McKinnon (1989) analyzes the effect of financial development on growth in 
Latin America using real interest rates as a measure of financial development. He finds 
that those countries that had high real interest rates had high levels of financial 
development and high real GDP. De Gregorio and Guidotti (1994) use a panel data 
analysis of 12 Latin American countries between 1950 and 1985 and find that there is a 
significant negative relationship between financial development and economic growth. 
On the other hand, Nazmi (2005) finds, using a panel data of 5 Latin American 




It is important to analyze the relationship between financial development and 
economic growth using more current data because of the significant changes that the 
financial sector has experienced in the late 1990s and early 2000s. Figure 2.1 shows 
private credit and liquid liabilities as a share of GDP in Latin America from 1961 to 
2005. This figure shows significant fluctuations in the levels of financial development: 
the average levels of financial development were lower in the 1960s than in the 1990s, 
dropped in the 1980s, and reached the highest point in the early 2000s. This paper 
analyzes the direction of causation between financial development and economic 
growth using data that accounts for these fluctuations. Pooling only Latin American 
countries in the analysis allows me to control for cross-country heterogeneity and to 
determine the real effects of financial development on economic growth in the region.
11
    
2.3 Data 
 I analyze the direction of causality between financial development and economic 
growth in a panel of 13 Latin American countries from 1961 to 2004.
 
The countries 
included are: Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, Mexico, Panama, Paraguay, Trinidad and Tobago, and 
Venezuela.
12
 The sample period allows me to capture the pre and post reform years. 
Table 2.1 provides a detailed description of all variables used and their sources, and 
Table 2.2 provides a summary statistics of these variables.  
I measure economic growth as the percentage change of real GDP per capita. To 
measure financial development, I use the growth of private credit issued by deposit 
money banks and other institutions as a share of GDP. I also use the growth of liquid 
liabilities as a share of GDP as a measure of financial development.
13
 The control 
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variables used in the multivariate VAR are the growth of the openness to trade as a 
share of GDP and the inflation rate. 
2.4 Model Specification 
I use a Granger causality test in a VAR framework to determine the direction of 
causality between financial development and economic growth. The panel VAR model 
in this analysis has the following form: 
tiptiptititi TDYAYAYAcY ,,2,21,10, ............ ελα +++++++= −−−     (1) 
where c is a vector of constants and for each j = 0, 1,…p, Yi, t – j is a vector of 
variables evaluated at time t – j, A j is a matrix that gives the relationship among the 
variables at time t – j, while ε i, t is a vector of error terms for the country i in period t. D 
is a vector of country dummy variables and T is a vector of time effects. 
This VAR estimation includes fixed effects to control for cross country 
differences and time variation. The fixed effect approach to the Granger causality test in 
a panel VAR provides the advantage of accounting for individual heterogeneity by 
removing the average variation across countries and across time.
14 
   
For the Granger causality test I use two specifications, a bivariate and a 
multivariate VAR. In the bivariate VAR, Yi, t – j is a vector of two variables: real GDP 
per capita growth and financial development growth evaluated at time t – j. In the 
multivariate VAR, Yi, t – j is a vector consisting of four variables, real GDP per capita 
growth, financial development growth, openness to trade growth, and inflation 
evaluated at time t – j. Because I experiment with different lags, j is equal to one, two, 
and four. Based on this framework, I test the hypotheses that financial development 
growth does not Granger cause real GDP per capita growth, and that real GDP per 
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capita growth does not Granger cause financial development. Therefore, the null 





H βββ , where FDβ are the coefficients of financial 





H βββ , where RGDPGβ are the coefficients of 
real GDP per capita growth (RGDPG) in periods t – p in the financial 
development growth equation. 
It is important to note that, although it is argued that time series techniques are 
biased in analyses that include few observations (small t), the results obtained from the 
Granger causality test in this analysis are reliable. According to Beggs (1986), cross 
sectional data improves the reliability of time series techniques. He shows that time 
series processes can be identified for samples that include at least 25 observations and 
five countries. In this analysis, I include at least 40 observations per country in the 
bivariate VAR and 36 in the multivariate VAR and at least six countries in the sample.
15
   
2.5 Empirical Results 
A. The Finance–Growth Link  
 Table 2.3 shows the results from the Granger causality test of the bivariate VAR 
model in a balanced panel framework with fixed effects. From this estimation, there is 
evidence of a bi-directional causality between financial development and economic 
growth. When using the growth of private credit and liquid liabilities as a share of GDP 
with the different lags (one, two, and four), results show that economic growth causes 
financial development at the 1 percent level. When using two and four lags, the growth 
of financial development causes economic growth at the 5 percent level. This indicates 
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not only that financial development is endogenously determined in the growth equation, 
but that it causes economic growth in Latin America. 
 To check for the robustness of these results, I perform a country-by-country 
Jack-knife Granger test analysis. For the Jack-knife approach, I perform the Granger 
causality test 13 times, each time excluding observations from one country in order to 
determine whether previous results are driven by a specific country. Table 2.4 presents 
the summary statistics of the Granger causality tests excluding one country at the time 
and using four lags and private credit as a measure of financial development. The 
standard deviation for the F-statistics obtained is less than one and the median of the F 
statistics shows that, in general, there is two way causality between financial 
development and economic growth at the 5 percent level. When estimating the Granger 
test by excluding one country at the time, I find that in all cases, economic growth 
granger causes financial development at the 1 percent level. In relation to whether 
financial development causes economic growth, I find that in 10 out of 13 cases, 
financial development growth causes economic growth at the 5 percent level. Based on 
these estimates, it can be concluded that there is strong evidence that economic growth 
Granger causes financial development and that this result does not depend on the exact 
sample used in this analysis.  
 I find a bi-directional causality using the multivariate VAR model with fixed 
effects and private credit as a measure of financial development. The variables included 
in this model are: real GDP growth, private credit growth, openness to trade growth, 
and inflation.
16
 To maintain a balanced panel structure, the multivariate VAR estimation 
uses a sample period from 1961 to 2003 and excludes Haiti, which lacks data on the 
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openness to trade series. For all the variables in the multivariate VAR, according to the 
Augmented Dicker-Fuller (ADF) unit root test, I reject the hypothesis that the series are 
non-stationary.
17
 Table 2.5 shows that economic growth Granger causes the growth of 
private credit at the 1 percent level, when using one, two, and four lags. The growth of 
private credit Granger causes economic growth when using two and four lags at the 5 
percent level.  
 From Tables 2.3, 2.4, and 2.5, it can be concluded that there is evidence of a bi-
directional causality between financial development and economic growth, where the 
effect of economic growth on financial development is a little more robust than the 
effect of financial development on economic growth. Therefore, based on these results 
obtained for the full sample, it can be said that financial development leads to a virtuous 
cycle in Latin America. 
B. The Finance–Growth Link Across Income Groups   
 In the analysis of the relationship between financial development and economic 
growth, many have argued that the effects of financial development may vary across 
countries due to their different income levels. For this reason, following Rioja and 
Valev’s (2004b) approach, I separate the 13 countries into two groups based on their 
income levels in 1960. The low income group includes Colombia, the Dominican 
Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, and Paraguay.  The high income group 
includes Costa Rica, El Salvador, Mexico, Panama, Trinidad and Tobago, and 
Venezuela. Since there is a difference in the initial real GDP per capita level of 595 (in 
constant USD) from the country with the highest income level in the low income group 
(Guatemala) and the country with the lowest income level in the high income group (El 
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Salvador), the cut off point that leads to including seven countries in the low income 
group and six in the high income group seems appropriate.   
 Tables 2.6 and 2.7 show the results obtained from the Granger causality test for 
the low and high income groups. These tables provide support to the argument that 
financial development leads to higher economic growth only for countries with higher 
initial income levels. Table 2.6 shows that for the low income countries, the growth of 
financial development does not Granger cause economic growth. On the other hand, for 
the high income group, Table 2.7 shows that the growth of private credit Granger causes 
economic growth at the 5 percent level when using one, two, and four lags. For both 
groups, there is evidence that economic growth leads to financial development at the 5 
percent level when using private credit and one and two lags. When using liquid 
liabilities as a measure of financial development and one and four lags, economic 
growth leads to financial development growth at the 5 percent level for both income 
groups.  
2.6 Conclusion   
 From these empirical results there are two main findings. First, there is a bi-
directional causality between the growth of financial development and economic growth 
for the whole sample from 1961 to 2004. Results show that, in average, economic 
growth promotes higher financial development and financial development causes 
economic growth. This result is robust to different measures of financial development 
(private credit and liquid liabilities), different samples (Jack-knife approach), and 
different estimation methods (bivariate and multivariate VAR). This finding is relevant 
in the sense that it supports the argument that financial development creates a virtuous 
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cycle in the economy. Second, this analysis shows that there is an income threshold that 
limits the effects of financial development on economic growth. Estimates show that 
financial development causes economic growth only in those countries that had high 
initial income levels. This finding is relevant for policymakers in the region because it 
shows that financial reforms will not necessarily have the same effects in all Latin 
American countries. This finding provides support to the argument that there may be 
some specific conditions that allow financial development to cause economic growth in 
high income countries that may not be present in low income countries.  
 Based on these empirical results, there may be initial conditions, specific 
institutions, or special macroeconomic circumstances that allow financial development 
to cause economic growth in certain countries. For further research, it would be 
valuable for policymakers to determine what are the other complementary reforms 
needed so that financial development leads to higher economic growth in Latin 
America.
                                                 
Notes 
 
1 Garcia Herrero et al. (2002), in a cluster analysis, find that the majority of Latin American 
countries are financially underdeveloped when compared to other emerging regions. 
 
2 Rioja and Valev (2004a,b) show that financial development has different effects on growth in 
countries with different income levels and different levels of financial development. 
Furthermore, Garcia-Herrero et al. (2002) show that countries included in this analysis have 
similar levels of financial development. 
 
3 They all address for endogeneity either using an IV approach or a GMM dynamic model. 
 
4 Ju and Wei (2005) developed the wooden barrel theory of international trade. Under this 
theory, economic growth depends on the financial sector if finance constraint is binding. 
 
5 Eschenbach (2004), in his survey of the literature, supports this view.  
 
6 Garcia Herrero et al. (2002, p.23) note that in 2000 “the stock market in Latin America is only 
one fourth of Asia’s in terms of capitalization, even after the Asian crisis.” Chile is the only 
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Latin American country that has a financial sector that is compared to the financial sector of 
some DCs. 
 
7 In 1914, Argentina had a bank deposits per head in US dollars of 75.5 and Guatemala had 0.9, 
while Australia, and Canada had 150.3 and 142.9 respectively (Bulmer-Thomas, 2003, p. 98). 
 
8 Marichal (1997) provides evidence of this for the Mexican case. 
 
9 Haber (2006) finds that the institutions established by the Mexican government determined the 
level of financial development in this country. He argues that the government monopolized the 
financial system and established a legal framework that lacked contract enforcement. 
 
10 Hosono (2002), in a comparative analysis of the financial sectors in Latin American and East 
Asian countries, provides support for De la Torre’s (2006) argument. He finds that the access to 
capital is limited in Latin America. According to Hosono (2002), new firms in Latin America 
use personal funds as their main source of capital and existing firms adjust to the lack of credit 
by getting credit from suppliers, advances from clients, or delaying tax payments.    
 
11 Grier and Tullock (1989) show that the effect of macroeconomic variables varies across 
countries and that it is not appropriate to pool together countries from different regions. Garcia 
Herrero et al. (2002) show, using a cluster analysis that takes into consideration income and 
financial development levels, that the majority of the Latin American countries belong to the 
same group.  
 
12 Other Latin American countries that belong to the same group, according to Garcia Herrero et 
al. (2002), were excluded from the sample due to the significant amount of missing observations 
for the financial development indicators. 
 
13 There were missing observations in the financial development indicators series for Colombia, 
which were filled in using linear interpolation. I use the growth of the financial development 
indicators since the levels have unit roots.  
 
14 In this fixed effect estimation, the individual effect is estimated for each country i in period t. 
This method removes the unobserved effects that are correlated with the explanatory variables 
and solves for the omitted variable bias (Wooldridge, 2002). Holtz et al. (1988) mention the 
advantages of using fixed effects in panel VAR estimations.   
 
15 Beggs (1986) argues that the bias associated with short time series sample is reduced when 
we pool cross-sectional units and the estimator is efficient.  He shows that, with the panel 
approach, the sampling variance of the estimator is reduced.   
 
16 In the multivariate VAR economic growth equation, when using four lags, the first and 
second lags of openness growth have a significant positive effect at the 10 percent level and the 
third lag of inflation has a significant negative effect at the 5 percent level. In the financial 
development growth equation, when using four lags, the second and third lags of inflation have 
a significant positive and negative effect at the 5 percent level. The economic growth and 
financial development growth equations have R-squares equal to 0.38 and 0.41 respectively. 
  
17 Other variables that have been used in a multivariate VAR framework, such as investment 
share of GDP and total factor productivity, were not included in this analysis because of their 
 55 
                                                                                                                                               
high correlation with GDP growth. The interest rate and the stock market index were not 
included since they are themselves indicators of financial development. See Luintel and Khan 
(1999), Xu (2000), and Shan (2005) for multivariate VAR models that include these variables. 
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Annual growth of real GDP per capita estimated using 
constant 2000 international dollars.  
RGDPG= (RGDPt – RGDPt-1)/RGDPt-1  




Annual growth of the value of credits by financial 
intermediaries to the private sector as a share of GDP. This 
measure includes credit issued by deposit money banks and 
other financial intermediaries.  
FDG = (FDt – FDt-1)/FDt-1  




Annual growth of liquid liabilities as a share of GDP.  
FDG = (FDt – FDt-1)/FDt-1  




Annual growth of openness to trade.  
TRADEG = (Open t – Opent-1)/Open t-1 




Percentage change of the Consumer Price Index (CPI) 
INF= (CPIt – CPIt-1)/CPIt-1 





Table 2.2 Summary Statistics (1961 – 2004) 
 
   Mean  Max  Min  S. D. Obs. 
Real GDP per Capita Growth  0.014 0.158 -0.152 0.040 572 
Private Credit Growth 0.024 0.866 -0.378 0.128 572 
Liquid Liabilities Growth 0.021 0.409 -0.296 0.088 572 
Trade Growth 0.017 0.496 -0.305 0.092 551 











Table 2.3 Bivariate VAR – Granger Causality F-Values (1961 – 2004) 
 
  k = 1 k = 2 k = 4 
 
Null Hypothesis: Financial development growth does not Granger-cause economic 
growth 
 
Private Credit 1.56  3.22  2.85  
 (0.21) (0.04) (0.02) 
Liquid liabilities 0.15  3.60  2.86  
 (0.70) (0.03) (0.02) 
 
Null Hypothesis: Economic growth does not Granger-cause financial development 
growth 
 
Private Credit 16.13  8.88  4.62  
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.00)  
Liquid liabilities 11.67  5.29  4.16  
 (0.00) (0.01) (0.00) 
    
Period 1962-2004 1963-2004 1965-2004 
Observations 559 546  520  
 
K = number of lags in the VAR 




Table 2.4 Jack-knife Granger Causality Test 
 
  Mean Med S. D. Min Max 
 
Null Hypothesis: Financial development growth does not Granger-cause economic 
growth 
 
F-Statistic 2.665 2.572 0.374 2.089 3.255 
Probability 0.038 0.037 0.021 0.012 0.081 
 
Null Hypothesis: Financial development growth does not Granger-cause economic 
growth 
 
F-Statistic 4.550 4.369 0.864 3.922 6.446 
Probability 0.002 0.002 0.001 0.000 0.004 
      
 
Each F statistic was estimated 13 times for N-1 of the countries in the sample; 480 





Table 2.5 Multivariate VAR – Granger Causality F-Values (1961 – 2003) 
 
  k = 1 k = 2 k = 4 
 
Null Hypothesis: Financial development growth does not Granger-cause economic 
growth 
 
Private Credit 2.66  3.70  2.90  
 (0.10) (0.03) (0.02) 
 
Null Hypothesis: Economic growth does not Granger-cause financial development 
growth 
 
Private Credit 15.03  7.07  3.71  
 (0.00)  (0.00)  (0.01) 
    
Period 1962-2003 1963-2003 1965-2003 
Observations* 504  492 468  
 
k = number of lags in the VAR 
p-values are in parenthesis and the p-values are the same using the Chi-sqr statistic. 
*This sample excludes Haiti due to missing observations in the openness to trade series. 
 
 
Table 2.6 Bivariate VAR – Granger Causality F-Values (1961 – 2004)  
Low Income Countries 
 
  k = 1 k = 2 k = 4 
 
Null Hypothesis: Financial development growth does not Granger-cause economic 
growth 
 
Private Credit 0.13  0.49  0.75  
 (0.72) (0.62) (0.56) 
Liquid liabilities 2.75  2.38  1.45  
 (0.10) (0.09) (0.22) 
 
Null Hypothesis: Economic growth does not Granger-cause financial development 
growth 
 
Private Credit 5.66  4.39  2.16  
 (0.02) (0.01) (0.07) 
Liquid liabilities 6.85  4.16  2.61  
 (0.01) (0.02) (0.04) 
    
Period 1962-2004 1963-2004 1965-2004 
Observations 301 294  280  
 
k = number of lags in the VAR 
p-values are in parenthesis and the p-values are the same when using the Chi-sqr statistic. 
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Table 2.7 Bivariate VAR – Granger Causality F-Values (1961 – 2004) 
High Income Countries 
 
  k = 1 K = 2 k = 4 
 
Null Hypothesis: Financial development growth does not Granger-cause economic 
growth 
 
Private Credit 6.61  5.60  3.03  
 (0.01) (0.00)  (0.02) 
Liquid liabilities 1.65  1.69  1.10  
 (0.20) (0.19) (0.36) 
 
Null Hypothesis: Economic growth does not Granger-cause financial development 
growth 
 
Private Credit 8.25  7.67  3.82  
 (0.00) (0.00)  (0.01) 
Liquid liabilities 5.75  2.76  2.97  
 (0.02) (0.07) (0.02) 
    
Period 1962-2004 1963-2004 1965-2004 
Observations 258 252  240  
 
k = number of lags in the VAR 


























































Life is Unfair in Latin America, But Does it Matter for Growth? 
 
3.1 Introduction  
 Many researchers have attempted to determine the effects of inequality on 
economic growth. While Kuznets (1955) stated that an increase in inequality in the 
early stages of development was a pattern in developed countries (DCs), others have 
argued that inequality is detrimental to growth (Easterly, 2007). Inequality in 
opportunities is relevant to economic development since the well-being of society is not 
only considered a function of income, but also a function of the access that individuals 
have to education, health, and other services (Sen, 2000). Therefore, the analysis of the 
persistence and the effects of inequality in less developed countries (LDCs) is important 
for policymakers.    
 Latin America is the second most unequal region of the world (World Bank, 
2006) and income inequality increased during the 1990s (Sáinz, 2006). The average 
Gini coefficient in the region between 2000 and 2005 was 54.2, which is considerably 
higher than the Gini coefficients of a sample of five DCs.
1
 In Latin America between 
2000 and 2005, the richest tenth of the population received on average more than 42 
percent of the total income, while the poorest 10 percent received between 0.25 and 
1.46 percent. On the other hand, in DCs, such as the United States, Canada, United 
Kingdom, France, and Italy, the richest tenth received on average between 22 and 30 
percent, while the poorest received between 1.80 and 4 percent (Table 3.1).
2
  
 Engerman and Sokoloff (2002) argue that initial factor endowments in Latin 
America, such as soil, climate, and the density of native population, produced an 
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unequal distribution of resources. Because Latin American countries have soils and 
climates suitable for the production of crops that require economies of scale and are 
labor intensive, there was an agricultural organization based on concentrated ownership 
of land in the colonial period. This early inequality led to the establishment of 
institutions that were detrimental to growth, and these institutions persisted over time. 
Hence, the unequal distribution of assets could be an important factor that keeps this 
region underdeveloped. 
 Recently, Easterly (2007) tested the Engerman and Sokoloff (ES) hypothesis by 
analyzing the effects of inequality on growth. He controlled for the possibility that 
inequality may be endogenously determined in a growth equation with an instrumental 
variable (IV) approach. In a cross-sectional framework, he used an instrument for 
inequality that is related to initial factor endowments: the abundance of land suitable for 
growing wheat relative to that for growing sugarcane. He showed that this instrument 
has a significant negative effect on income inequality, where suitability to grow wheat 
is associated with a more equal distribution of resources. He finds support for the ES 




 Most studies on the effect of inequality on growth are cross-sectional or use 
inconsistent measures of inequality, and it is easy to see why. To obtain a measure of 
inequality that is available over time for a large set of LDCs is difficult. Gini 
coefficients on income and land distribution are not available consistently for Latin 
American countries, and taking a panel framework approach to analyze the effects of 




Nonetheless, to determine the effects of inequality on growth in a panel framework, the 
area of family farms as a percentage of total area of agricultural holdings can be used. 
This measure was constructed by Vanhanen (2003a) and is available from 1850 to 2000 
for a large set of countries in a 10 year frequency.  
 In this paper I analyze the effects of inequality on economic growth in a panel of 
18 Latin American countries from 1960 to 2004. I test the ES hypothesis by using a 
measure of inequality that is related to resource distribution, the area of family farms as 
a percentage of the total area of agricultural holdings. The ES hypothesis posited that 
countries with soils suitable to grow wheat were more likely to have family farms, and 
therefore, had a more equal distribution of income. The share of family farms is an 
important measure of inequality because access to land has been associated with the 
degree to which people participate in the economic and political systems. In Latin 
America, even after rapid urbanization, access to land is an important determinant of 
wealth and social mobility (Torche and Spilerman, 2006). Individuals who have access 
to land are also more likely to participate in the political process and receive an 
education. 
 I find that inequality has nonlinear effect on growth, where the effect of family 
farms share on growth is increasing up to a certain level, once this level is reached the 
effect of family farms share on growth is decreasing. This finding is robust after 
controlling for urbanization, where highly urbanized countries benefit the most from a 
greater family farms share. Based on the family farm shares in 1998, all the countries in 
this analysis would benefit by increases in the share of family farms since they have 
family farm shares at which the effect of family farms on growth is increasing. For the 
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purpose of robustness, I analyze the effect of an alternative measure of resource 
distribution, which accounts for agricultural and non-agricultural resource distribution, 
on growth. Later, I estimate the effect of inequality on growth by instrumenting for this 
measure of inequality. I find that the nonlinear effect of inequality on economic growth 
is robust when using this alternative measure of inequality and instrumenting for 
inequality.   
 This paper is organized as follows: Section 3.2 reviews the literature on the 
effects of inequality on growth and discusses the importance of analyzing the effects of 
resource distribution on economic growth in Latin America; Sections 3.3 presents the 
methodology used in this analysis; Sections 3.4 and 3.5 discuss the results obtained 
from the empirical analysis and the robustness tests; and Section 3.6 concludes. 
3.2 Literature Review 
A. The effect of inequality on growth 
There are several theoretical models which explain why inequality may 
negatively affect economic growth. First, the imperfect capital market model states that, 
with high inequality, it will be difficult for poor people to invest in physical and human 
capital. In a society where wealth is not equally distributed, the poor face credit 
constraints, and this leads to a vicious cycle of low productivity and economic growth 
(Banerjee and Newman, 1991; Galor and Zeira, 1993). Second, in the political economy 
framework, the model of redistribution states that as inequality increases the median 
voter will be more likely to vote for redistributive policies. These policies deter 
economic growth since they discourage investment (Benabou, 1996; 2000). Third, in 
the social conflict model, high inequality is associated with lower economic growth 
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because it precedes social unrest and political instability. Economic growth in this 
model is hampered by inequality because instability discourages investment (Benhabib 
and Rustichini, 1996). Fourth, inequality can have a negative effect on growth through 
its effect on institutions. Highly unequal societies may be unable to achieve democracy 
since the distribution of resources determines the distribution of political power 
(Acemoglu and Robinson, 2006; Vanhanen, 2003b). In highly unequal societies, there 
are institutions that promote the persistence of inequality and that hamper economic 
growth in the long run (Engerman and Sokoloff, 2002). 
There is some empirical support for the idea that inequality negatively affects 
growth. In a sample of 64 countries, Deininger and Squire (1998) find evidence in favor 
of the imperfect capital model. Alesina and Rodrick (1994) and Persson and Tabellini 
(1994) find empirical support for the political economy model of redistribution, both in 
a broad sample of 46 countries and in one restricted to DCs. Alesina and Perotti (1996) 
and Rodrick (1999) show that inequality decreases growth through its effects on 
instability using cross-sectional samples.
5
 Vanhanen (2003b) presents empirical support 
for his resource distribution theory of democratization, where the distribution of 
resources determines the distribution of political power. He finds, in an analysis that 
includes 170 countries, that the distribution of resources determined the average level of 
democracy between 1999 and 2001. Keefer and Knack (2002) and Easterly et al. (2006) 
show empirically that high inequality leads to bad institutions, such as weak property 
rights and low governance.
6
  
    On the other hand, there is also theoretical and empirical work that finds that 
inequality is beneficial to growth, supporting Kuznets’ (1955) inverse U shaped 
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relationship between inequality and growth.
7
 Barro (2000) argues that the imperfect 
capital market model can explain the positive effect of inequality on growth. In equally 
distributed societies, there are low levels of investment because firms tend to be small. 
Small firms have less incentive to invest since they face low returns on investment. 
Furthermore, since the rich will have less incentive to save in an environment with less 
redistribution, lower levels of inequality are associated with lower savings rates. 
Partridge (1997), Li and Zou (1998), and Forbes (2000) show empirically that 
inequality leads to higher economic growth. Alternatively, Barro (2000) finds that 
inequality has a positive effect on growth only in rich countries; in poor countries 
increases in inequality produce a negative effect on growth. Nonetheless, Banerjee and 
Duflo (2003) challenge previous empirical and theoretical work by arguing that 
inequality has a nonlinear effect on economic growth. According to them, the nonlinear 
effect of inequality on growth, measurement bias, and endogeneity of inequality explain 
why there are different empirical results.  
 There is no general consensus on the effect of inequality on growth. However, 
this analysis could benefit significantly with econometric techniques that take into 
consideration the dynamics of the relationship between inequality and growth over time. 
Obtaining a measure of inequality that is consistent through time and that is comparable 
across countries is difficult. Because Gini coefficients of income distribution are usually 
estimated from different surveys that cover different populations and different sources 
of income (income, earnings, consumption, or expenditure), using them in the analysis 
of the effects of inequality on growth can be problematic.
8
 In fact, Atkinson and 
Brandolini (2001) show, using a sample of DCs, how the distribution of income differs 
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from one source to another and how this leads to misleading empirical results in the 
analysis of the effects of inequality on growth.
9
 In addition, Perry et al. (2006) argue 
that Gini coefficients based on income surveys are biased since surveys reflect short 
term income but not lifetime income. 
 In the analysis of the effects of inequality on growth, an alternative approach is 
to use a measure of inequality that is related to resource distribution. Since the income 
of individuals depends significantly on the access to the means of production, we could 
use a measure related to the access that individuals have to land to quantify inequality.   
B. Resource distribution in Latin America 
 Resource distribution is a key determinant of long run economic growth 
according to the ES hypothesis (2002). Engerman and Sokoloff (2002) posited that 
factor endowments determined how resources were distributed in the colonial period in 
Latin America. In highly unequal environments, institutions that precluded the 
participation of a large fraction of the population in the economic and political systems 
and promoted the persistence of inequality were created. On the other hand, in more 
equally distributed societies, the institutions established allowed the majority of the 
population to take advantage of economic opportunities and to participate in the 
political process. According to Engerman and Sokoloff (2006, p.74) “economic 
institutions shape opportunities”, and these opportunities were important for the early 
industrialization process of Latin American countries. In the ES hypothesis, levels of 
inequality determined the type of economic institutions, and consequently the prospects 
of long run economic growth.     
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 Several empirical and theoretical analyses attempted to test the ES hypothesis.
10
 
Acemoglu and Robinson (2006) and Acemoglu (2007) argue that in unequal 
environments, there is more likely to be an oligarchic political system that does not 
allow for democratization. Rajan and Zingales (2006) argue that within an oligarchic 
system there are institutions that promote the persistence of inequality and barriers to 
entering the market and the political process that are costly for society. Based on the ES 
hypothesis, resource distribution determines the type of institutions established, and 
therefore, plays a central role in development.
11
 
 To account for resource distribution in the analysis of the effects of inequality 
on growth, some have used the Gini coefficient of land distribution (Birdsall and 
Londono, 1997; Deininger and Squire, 1998; Easterly, 2001; Engerman and Sokoloff, 
2005).
12
 These analyses find that inequitable ownership of land depresses growth 
through its effect on the political environment, institutions, investment, and schooling.  
 An alternative measure of inequality related to resource distribution is the area 
of family farms as a percentage of the total area of agricultural holdings. This measure 
has been associated with the distribution of income in North America and Latin 
America (Przeworski and Curvale, 2005).
13
 Easterly (2007) shows, for a large sample of 
countries, that the share of family farms in early periods has a significant negative effect 
on the average of the income share of the top quintile from 1960 to 1998. In addition, I 
find a negative correlation of 0.72 between the average of the Gini coefficient of land 
distribution and the family farms share from 1960 to 2000.
14
 Because the control of land 
has been unequally distributed in Latin American since the colonial period (Birdsall and 
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Londono, 1997; Morley, 2001; Justino et al. 2003; Perry et al. 2006; Torche and 
Spilerman, 2006), the share of family farms seems a reasonable measure of inequality. 
 Few have attempted to test the effect of inequality on growth in Latin America. 
De Gregorio (1992), in a growth equation for 12 Latin American countries from 1950 to 
1985, finds that income inequality has no significant effect on growth. De Gregorio and 
Lee (2005), in a sample period from 1970 to 2000, find that income inequality has no 
effect on growth, but that it has a significant negative effect on schooling and 
institutional quality and a positive effect on fertility.
15
 To measure inequality, De 
Gregorio (1992) uses the share of income received by the highest 20 percent, the lowest 
20 percent, and the lowest 40 percent of households; De Gregorio and Lee (2005) use 
the income Gini coefficient. While they both use a panel framework, De Gregorio’s 
(1992) measure of inequality is time invariant. There are measurement issues related to 
the measure of inequality used by De Gregorio and Lee (2005) since it is obtained from 
the World Income Inequality Database (WIID). My paper differs from these previous 
analyses by using the share of family farms, which is consistently available for Latin 
American countries, and a larger sample period that accounts for current changes in 
economic growth and inequality. 
3.3 Methodology 
 The countries in my sample are: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, 
Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. I construct 10 
year averages from 1960 to 1999, except for the last observation which is only a five 
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year average from 2000 to 2004. There are 5 observations per country for a total of 90 
observations.  
 The measure of inequality that I use is the share of family farms constructed by 
Vanhanen (2003a). Vanhanen (2003b) defines a family farm as any farm that employs 
no more than four people, including family members. A benefit of using the family 
farms share instead of the Gini coefficient of land distribution is that the former 
accounts for “holdings that are mainly cultivated by the holder family itself and are 
owned by the cultivator family or held in ownerlike possession” (Vanhanen, 2003b, p. 
84). Therefore, the share of family farms used as a measure of equality helps us to avoid 
the problem of not including in our measure those individuals who have control of land 
but may not have legal ownership, have communal ownership, or tenancy rights. 
According to Vanhanen (2003) those individuals should be considered socially and 
economically independent and they should be accounted for when measuring inequality.  
 When using the share of family farms as a measure of inequality, there are some 
caveats. The concept of family farms has been kept fixed by Vanhanen (2003a), but it is 
possible that it differs across countries and across time due to differences in technology 
and geographic conditions. The share of family farms is estimated mainly from 
agricultural censuses provided by the Food and Agriculture Organization (FAO) of the 
United Nations, but other sources were used when agricultural holdings were not 
available from the FAO reports. Many LDCs have experienced fast urbanization that 
has decreased their agricultural activity, and it could be argued that the share of family 
farms is not relevant for the distribution of income today. However, the access to land 
reveals the initial conditions that individuals face in the urbanization process. Although 
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these caveats are relevant, the share of family farms is the only measure of inequality 
that is available consistently through time for a large sample of Latin American 
countries in the period of analysis.  
 To analyze the effect of inequality on growth, I estimate a version of the 
augmented Solow model: 
 =− −1,, )ln()ln( titi YY   tititi schoolYIY ,3,21,10 )ln()/ln()ln( αααα +++ −  (1) 
    titign ,,4 )ln( εδα ++++  
 In equation (1), the dependent variable is the period average of the difference of 
the natural log of real GDP per capita. I control for initial conditions by using the 
average of the natural log of real GDP per capita in the previous period. The natural log 
of investment as a share of GDP (I/Y) and the natural log of schooling (school) are 
included as independent variables. I also include a term that controls for population 
growth (n), technology advancement (g), and depreciation (δ). In this model, n is 
measured as the growth rate of the working age population and g + δ is assumed to be 
equal to 0.05 (Mankiw et al., 1992).    
 Inequality is measured as the area of family farms as a percentage of the total 
area of agricultural holdings, so increases in this variable represent increases in equality. 
Since inequality may be correlated with unobservable factors associated with growth, I 
use the first lag of the family farms share. Banerjee and Duflo (2001) argue that changes 
in inequality are more costly in terms of growth at either very high or very low levels of 
inequality, hence, I test for the nonlinear effect of inequality on growth by including the 
square of the lagged family farms share. This leads to the following equation: 
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              (2) 
   
 In equation (2), Si,t,t-1 represents the variables from the augmented Solow model 
specified in equation (1), and T is a vector of four time dummy variables. The measure 
of equality is the share of family farms. The variables used in this analysis and their 
sources are described in Table 3.2; Table 3.3 shows the summary statistics.    
3.4 Results 
 Column 1 of Table 3.4 shows the results of estimating the basic growth model 
specified in equation (1), with ordinary least squares (OLS) and time period dummies.
16
 
In this estimation, initial real GDP per capita has a significant negative effect at the 5 
percent level, which supports the idea of conditional convergence. Investment has a 
significant positive effect at the 1 percent level, which is expected as well. The 
coefficients for human capital and (n + g + δ) have the expected signs but are not 
statistically significant. I add the lagged family farms share to the augmented Solow 
model and find that it is statistically significant at the 1 percent level. Column 2 shows 
that the effect of the level of family farms on growth is small since an increase of the 
share of family farms by one standard deviation (10.25) increases growth by 0.3 
percent. In column 3, I report the results of adding the square of the lagged family farms 
share. I find that the level and the square of family farms share are statistically 
significant at the 1 percent level. These estimates support the argument that inequality 
has a nonlinear effect on growth.  
 Using the coefficients from column 3 of Table 3.4, Figure 3.1 shows how 
economic growth varies with changes in the family farms share. The effect of the family 
tiitT ,ελ ++
2
1,21,11,,1,, )ln()ln( −−−− ++=− titittititi equalityequalitySYY ββ
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farms share on growth is increasing up to the point where the family farms share is 
equal to 40 percent. After the share of family farms reaches 40 percent, any further 
increase in family farms have a decreasing effect on growth. This result supports 
Banerjee and Duflo’s (2003) finding that growth is hampered at very high and very low 
levels of inequality.    
 Figure 3.1 shows an inverse U shaped relationship between inequality and 
growth and this finding is relevant for policymakers in Latin America. The latest 
available observations for the share of family farms (1998) are shown in Table 3.5. This 
table shows that all countries in the sample would benefit by an increase in the family 
farms share since the sample mean of the share of family farms is 25.61 and all the 
countries have current family farm shares in the left hand side of the curve in Figure 
3.1. Figure 3.2 shows a close up of the effect of increases of family farms share up to 
the point where the effect of an increase on the share of family farms on growth is 
increasing (40 percent). The countries with the lowest family farms share are Honduras, 
Paraguay, Venezuela, and Panama (with family farm shares below 20 percent), and 
those with the highest family farms share are Colombia, Mexico, Costa Rica, Ecuador, 
and El Salvador (with family farm shares between 32 and 36 percent).   
 Furthermore, to determine whether my results are robust to different model 
specifications, I add to the growth equation two other variables commonly used in 
analyses of the effect of inequality on growth. Column 4 of Table 3.4 shows the results 
of controlling for government expenditure by including the natural log of government 
consumption as percentage of real GDP. I find that, although the coefficient of the 
natural log of government consumption share has a significant negative effect at the 1 
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percent level, the family farms share still has a significant nonlinear effect on growth. 
Political regime type has been also considered as an important determinant of growth. 
Following Perotti (1996) and Barro (2000), I add the growth rate of the period average 
of the polity score to the growth equation to account for changes on the political regime. 
The polity score is the combined score of the democracy and autocracy scores and goes 
from -10 to 10, where 10 is assigned to high democracies and -10 to high autocracies. 
Estimates in column 5 show that the growth of the polity score has a significant positive 
effect at the 1 percent level, while inequality still has a significant nonlinear effect on 
economic growth. It is important to note that the coefficients’ magnitude and 
significance on the level and square of the lagged family farms share are the same when 
these control variables are added (columns 3 to 5).
17
   
 Additionally, I determine whether the nonlinear effect of inequality on growth is 
relevant for Latin American countries when I control for urbanization. It could be 
argued that my results may be driven by certain countries that are less urbanized, and 
that the share of family farms has no impact on growth in highly urbanized countries. I 
include in the growth equation the first lag of a dummy variable that is equal to one if a 
country has a period average of urban population as a percentage of total population 
equal or greater than 50 percent and an interaction term of the first lag of the share of 
family farms and this urban dummy. Table 3.5 shows in which decade a country had for 
the first time an average of urban population share of 50 percent or above. The countries 
that started the period of analysis with a urban population share higher or equal to 50 
percent were Argentina, Chile, Colombia, Mexico, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela. 
Table 3.4, column 6 shows that the nonlinear effect of equality on growth persists and, 
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while the urban dummy has a significant negative effect at the 1 percent level, the 
interaction term has a significant positive effect at the 1 percent level, meaning that 
highly urbanized countries benefit the most with larger family farm shares in the 
previous period. Without taking into consideration the nonlinear effect of inequality on 
growth, an increase of the family farms share by one standard deviation in highly 
urbanized countries in the previous period causes an increase on growth of 1 percent.   
3.5 Robustness Tests 
 To check for the robustness of the nonlinear effect of inequality on growth I use 
a measure of inequality that takes into consideration not only the distribution of 
agricultural resources, but also the distribution of non-agricultural resources. I use as an 
alternative measure of inequality the index of power resources (IPR). This index takes 
into consideration the distribution of land, non-agricultural resources, and education. In 
addition, I deal with potential endogeneity issues by instrumenting for inequality and 
investment.            
 Since many Latin American countries have become highly urbanized and other 
types of wealth have become important for the distribution of income, I use the IPR as a 
measure of inequality. Vanhanen (2003) constructed the IPR by dividing by 10,000 the 
product of three indices that account for the distribution of different types of resources: 
the index of occupational diversification, the index of knowledge distribution, and the 
index of the distribution of economic power resources.  
 The index of occupational diversification measures the decentralization of 
economic and organizational power resources. This index is the mean of two indicators 
of the percentage of the population that do not participate in agricultural activities: the 
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percentage of the urban population and the percentage of non-agricultural population of 
the total population. According to Vanhanen (2003b), the larger this index, the higher 
the occupational diversification is, and the more distributed economic and human power 
resources are. The index of knowledge distribution is the mean of the percentage of 
students in higher education per 100,000 inhabitants and the percentage of literate 
population. This index accounts for the distribution of knowledge at two different 
educational levels. The index of the distribution of economic power resources is equal 
to the share family farms times the percentage of the agricultural population plus the 
degree of decentralization of non-agricultural resources times the percentage of the non-
agricultural population. This index accounts for the distribution of resources in the 
agricultural and non-agricultural sectors in relation to the population in each sector.      
 The IPR goes from zero to 100 and is a measure of the distribution of different 
resources, such as access to land, different occupations, knowledge, and non-
agricultural assets. The higher the IPR, the more distributed power and resources are. 
According to Vanhanen (2003b), the IPR is a good approximation of the distribution of 
resources in a society since it takes into consideration those resources that allow 
individuals to participate in the political process and the economic system.   
 Table 6 reports the results of including the IPR as a measure of equality in the 
growth equation. Estimates in column 2 support the finding of a nonlinear effect of 
inequality on growth.
18
 The level and square of IPR are both statistically significant at 
the 1 percent level with positive and negative coefficients respectively. In this 
estimation, the coefficients for the measure of equality are bigger than those found 
when using family farms share. Figure 3 shows the nonlinear effect of inequality on 
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growth, where the effect of an increase in the IPR is increasing up to the point where the 
IPR is equal to 24, after which, the effect on growth is decreasing. The average of the 
IPR in 1998 is 16 and all countries, except Argentina, Uruguay, Chile, and Venezuela 
have IPRs on the left hand side of the curve in Figure 4. The countries with the lowest 
IPR are Guatemala, Paraguay, Honduras, and Bolivia.  
 The nonlinear effect of inequality on growth remains robust when adding to the 
estimation the natural log of the government share and the growth of the polity score 
one at the time (columns 3 and 4).
19
 Column 5 of Table 3.6 shows the estimates 
obtained when I use the IPR as a measure of equality and control for urbanization. In 
this estimation, there is a nonlinear effect of inequality, but the urban dummy and the 
interaction term are not statistically significant. Since the IPR takes into account the 
distribution of non-agricultural resources as well, it is expected that the urban dummy 
and the interaction term will make no difference in the estimation. 
 I explore whether my results are robust to a different model specification that 
addresses the issue that the first lag of the measure of equality may be correlated with 
the error term. I use a general method of moments (GMM) estimator with White’s 
robust standard errors and period fixed effects. Easterly (2007), in his cross-sectional 
analysis, uses the natural log of the wheat-sugar ratio as an instrument for inequality. 
Since the analysis here is in a panel framework and an instrument that varies through 
time is preferred, my instrument for inequality is Easterly’s (2007) instrument times the 
natural log of the period average of the price of wheat. Table 3.7 shows that this new 
instrument is a good explanatory variable of the IPR, but not of the family farms share. 
The correlation between the instrument and the IPR is equal to 0.50. Therefore, I 
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perform the GMM estimation only for the model that includes the linear and quadratic 
effect of the IPR.  
 Table 3.8 shows the GMM estimates obtained when I use Easterly’s (2007) 
transformed instrument, a second lag of inequality and three time dummy variables as 
instruments for the IPR. Column 1 shows that the level of IPR has a significant positive 
effect at the 1 percent level, while the squared of IPR has a significant negative effect at 
the 5 percent level. The magnitude of the coefficient for the linear term is larger in this 
estimation than what was found earlier. At the same time I use the instruments for 
inequality mentioned before, I also address the endogeneity of investment by using the 
first lag of investment as an instrument. Column 2 shows very similar coefficients to 
those found before. I test in both GMM estimations the validity of the overidentifying 
restrictions. I find that the J test for both estimations is less than zero; therefore, I cannot 




 3.6 Conclusion 
 The results obtained in this empirical analysis are relevant for the analysis of the 
effect of inequality on growth and for policymakers in Latin America. This analysis 
benefits significantly from using a measure of inequality that is observable through time 
for a large sample of Latin American countries. The empirical results show a robust 
nonlinear effect of inequality on growth in Latin America. It can be concluded that 
countries in Latin America could benefit from more equality up to a certain level. After 
equality reaches this level, the effect of increases in equality on growth will be 
decreasing.  
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 When using the family farms share as a measure of inequality, I find that all 
countries would benefit with increases in the share of family farms. When I use the IPR 
measure, I find that some countries will benefit more than others with increases in this 
index. For example, Honduras and Paraguay will benefit significantly by increases in 
both since they are ranked as most unequal based on the share of family farms and IPR. 
While Argentina, Chile, and Venezuela are ranked as three of the four most equally 
distributed in terms of the IPR, they have family farm shares below the sample mean. 
On the other hand, Bolivia and Guatemala are ranked as two of the four most unequally 
distributed based on the IPR, but have family farm shares above the sample mean. 
Therefore, this shows that some countries should focus policy efforts on making 
agricultural resources more equally distributed, while others should focus on achieving 
a more equal distribution of non-agricultural resources. 
 Since an increase in the percentage of family farms would seem to be beneficial 
in Latin America, programs that promote agricultural activity on a small scale, such as 
the creation of microfinancing and support institutions, could benefit the region 
significantly. A more developed financial system, in which individuals have more 
access to private credit could also promote an increase in the percentage of family 
farms. In fact, credit markets play a central role on the expansions of agricultural 
activity at a small scale since the poor lack the capital required for this type of activity. 
In addition, programs that allow farmers to insure themselves against natural disasters 
or bad weather conditions could also promote more equality in Latin America. These 
programs can significantly help to avoid poverty traps in agricultural areas. 
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 Because one of the components of the IPR is the index of the distribution of 
knowledge, another important policy implication from this analysis is that more equality 
could be achieved by increasing the access and the quality of public education. 
Increases in literacy rates and the number of students that attained higher education 
could lead to a better distribution of resources, and consequently, to higher economic 
growth in Latin American countries. The unequal distribution of human capital in Latin 
America has contributed to the perpetuation of high income inequality. Therefore, to 
break the cycle of high inequality in the region, policymakers need to target those 
segments of the population that are unable to invest in human capital. 
                                                 
Notes 
 
1 See Table 3.1 for an explanation of how this average was estimated and the source of the data. 
Table 3.1 also shows the average of the Gini coefficient for five DCs. 
 
2 See De Ferranti et al. (2004) for a comprehensive study of inequality in Latin America. 
  
3 Replicating his estimation in a sample restricted to 20 Latin American countries, I find similar 
results. In a cross-sectional framework, I use the average of the Gini coefficients from 1960 to 
2000 provided by the World Institute of Development and Economics Research (WIDER) and 
Easterly’s (2007) instrument for income inequality. I find that income inequality has a negative 
effect on growth and the percentage of secondary enrollment. This empirical analysis is not 
included for reasons of space, but the results are available upon request. 
 
4 Appendix, Table A.3.1 shows that if a minimal criterion was specified for the Gini coefficient 
of income distribution, only 6 of the 18 Latin American countries included in this analysis 
would have observations from 1960 to 2000 using the World Income Inequality Database, May 
2007 version (WIID2). Table A.3.2 shows that there are only few available Gini coefficients of 
land distribution for the Latin American countries included in this analysis.  
 
5 Benabou (1996) presents a review of the theoretical models that explain the negative effects of 
inequality on growth and a table with the results of a large number of empirical analyses. 
 
6 Thorbecke and Charumilind (2002) present a figure showing all the different channels through 
which inequality affects growth negatively. Birdsall (2007) reviews the negative effects of 
inequality on growth in LDCs. 
 
7 Fields (2001) presents a review on Kuznets hypothesis and on the empirical analyses that test 
this hypothesis.  
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8 See Deininger and Squire (1996) for an explanation on these measurement issues. 
 
9 Panizza (2002) also shows empirically that different methods used to measure inequality lead 
to different empirical results in the United States.  
 
10 See Easterly (2007) for a review on the ES hypothesis. 
 
11 See Hoff (2003) and Levine (2005) for a good review on the theoretical and empirical work 
on this hypothesis. 
 
12 See Frankema’s (2006) appendix for an overview on how is the land Gini coefficient 
estimated. 
 
13 Przeworski and Curvale (2005) show, in a sample that includes 15 Latin American countries, 
Canada, and the United States, that there is a negative correlation between the family farms 
share and the income Gini coefficient.   
 
14 For the countries included in this analysis, I calculate the average of the land Gini coefficient 
using the available observations provided by Frankema (2006).  
 
15 Some have found that income inequality has deterred the accumulation of physical and 
human capital in the region (Grier, 2002; De Gregorio and Lee, 2003; Motiram and Nugent, 
2007). Others argue that education is unequally distributed in Latin America, and this has 
contributed to the perpetuation of high levels of inequality (Altimir, 1997; Frankema and Bolt, 
2006). 
 
16 All estimations are OLS with White’s standard errors and period fixed effects, unless 
specified otherwise.  
 
17 The size and significance of the coefficients on the level and square of lagged family farms 
share do not change if I include in the growth equation the natural log of the government share 
and the polity growth at the same time. Results were not included for reasons of space. 
 
18 Column 1 of Table 3.6 shows that equality has no effect on growth when only the level of 
IPR is included. 
 
19 The size and significance of the coefficients on the level and square of lagged IPR do not 
change if I include in the growth equation the natural log of the government share and the polity 
growth at the same time. Results were not included for reasons of space. 
 
20 The critical value for the chi-square distribution, with 3 degrees of freedom, at the 15 percent 
level is 5.32.  
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Table 3.1 Averages of Gini Coefficients and Income Share of Lowest and Highest 
Deciles (2000 – 2005) 














Bolivia 61.69 61.30 0.25 48.01 
Brazil 58.51 58.25 0.90 46.84 
Chile 56.42 57.06 1.21 46.66 
Colombia 56.95 57.08 0.75 45.36 
Costa Rica 48.76 48.46 1.30 37.18 
Dom. Republic 51.09 51.09 1.36 40.19 
Ecuador 56.02 56.37 1.03 45.34 
El Salvador 51.68 51.83 0.78 38.63 
Guatemala 54.12 54.12 1.03 42.70 
Honduras 54.35 54.35 0.96 41.82 
Mexico 52.36 52.39 1.19 41.19 
Nicaragua 54.42 54.42 1.22 44.10 
Panama 56.32 56.17 0.73 43.16 
Paraguay 56.86 56.86 0.77 44.76 
Peru 51.69 51.69 1.17 40.61 
Venezuela 45.91 45.64 1.46 34.22 
     
Latin American 
countries average 54.20 54.19 1.01 42.55 
     
United States 44.36 44.52 1.80 29.47 
Canada 33.01 33.02 2.71 24.75 
United Kingdom 27.6 27.4 4.0 22.0 
France 34.1 34.1 2.4 25.2 
Italy 33.6 33.8 2.9 26.5 
Averages are obtained from available observations that meet the three following criteria: 
a) The coverage is the whole population and area 
b) The income share unit of analysis is the household  
c) The definition is based on the income concept 
Argentina and Uruguay are not included in this table since the gini coefficients available did 
not meet these criteria. 
* Gini calculated by World Institute for Development Economic Reasearch (WIDER) using 
methods developed by Tony Shorrocks and Guang Hua Wan, which estimate the Gini 
coefficient from decile data almost as accurately as if unit record data were used. 
** Reported Gini by the source or calculated by WIDER or Deininger and Squire for the old 
databases that estimates the Gini coefficient with a program that uses parametric extrapolation 
called POVCAL. 
 
Source: World Income Inequality Database (WIID2), WIDER. 
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(GDP growth per 
capita) 
 
Dependent variable equal to lnYt – lnY t-1. Variable estimated 
as the period average of the difference of the natural log of 
real GDP per capita (constant prices: Laspeyres).   
Source: Penn World Tables 6.2.  
 
Real GDP per capita 
(Y) 
Period average of the natural log of real GDP per capita 
(constant prices: Laspeyres).  




Period average of investment share of real GDP (constant 
prices: Laspeyres).  




n is the period average of the growth rate of the working age 
population (15 to 64). 




depreciation (g + δ) 
 
Technological growth is represented by g and depreciation is 
represented by δ. g + δ is equal to 0.05. (n + g + δ) 





Period average of the percentage of the population that 
attained secondary education.  
Source: Barro and Lee (2000). 
 
Family farms share 
(equality) 
The area of family farms as a percentage of the total area of 
holdings. Variable available in 10 year frequency.  
Source: Vanhanen (2003a). 
 




Estimated by Vahanen (2003a) “by multiplying the values of 
index of occupational diversification, index of knowledge 
distribution, and index of the distribution of economic power 
resources and then dividing the product by 10 000.” Variable 
available in 10 year frequency.  
Source: Vanhanen (2003a). 
 
Government share  
(G/Y) 
 
Period average of the government share of real GDP 
(constant prices: Laspeyres).  




Growth of the period average of the combined polity score 
(polity2) computed by subtracting the autocracy score from 
the democracy score.   












Computed by multiplying the natural log of the wheat-sugar 
ratio by the natural log of the period average of the price 
index of wheat. 
Sources: Easterly (2007) and Oxford Latin American 
Economic History Database 
 
Urban dummy Dummy equal to 1 if a country has a period average of the 
percentage of the population that lives in urban areas of 50 
percent or above. 
Source: World Development Indicators (2006).   
 
Variables are estimated as the 10 year average from 1960 to 1999 and as the 5 year average 





Table 3.3 Summary Statistics (1960 – 2004) 
        
  Mean Med. S. D. 
GDP growth per capita 0.01 0.01 0.02 
Ln(Y) 8.49 8.50 0.44 
Ln(I/Y) 2.53 2.51 0.40 
ln(n + g + δ) -2.59 -2.57 0.11 
ln(school) 2.53 2.54 0.59 
Family farms share t-1 23.33 23.00 10.25 
Index of power resources t-1 7.38 4.80 6.97 
ln(G/Y) 2.90 2.88 0.28 
Polity growth -0.66 -0.03 2.13 
ln(wheat-sugar ratio)*ln(Pwheat) -0.17 -0.52 1.11 
Urban dummy  0.67 1.00 0.47 
All variables have 90 observations since the summary statistics for the family farms share 
and the index of power resources are from 1951 to 1999. 
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Table 3.4 Growth Model with Inequality 
             
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
Constant 0.05 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.06 0.03 






























 (2.98) (2.84) (2.87) (3.05) (2.86) (4.10) 
ln(n + g + δ) t -0.01 0.002 0.01 0.01 0.01 -0.003 
 (0.37) (0.15) (0.45) (0.31) (0.63) (0.20) 
ln(school) t 0.001 0.003 0.004 0.004 0.004 0.001 
 (0.52) (1.32) (1.47) (1.37) (1.35) (0.49) 











  (2.58) (4.46) (6.54) (4.61) (1.88) 
Family farms
2









   (3.95) (6.51) (4.47) (3.36) 
ln(G/Y) t    -0.01
 a
   
    (2.67)   
Polity growth t     0.001
 a
  
     (5.81)  
Urban dummyt-1      -0.025
 a
 
      (4.98) 
Urban dummyt-1 
*family farmst-1      0.001 
a
 
      (6.92) 
R-squared 0.47 0.49 0.50 0.51 0.50 0.55 
t-statistics in parentheses use White’s robust standard errors. a, b, and, c represent statistical 
significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively. All estimations have 90 
observations. Only the estimation in column 6 has 72 observations since urban population rates 
are not available in the 1950s. Estimations include time dummies but coefficients are not shown 
for space purposes. 
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Table 3.5 Resource Inequality and Urbanization in Latin America 









































































































      
Mean   25.61  15.58 59.34 
Median  26  14.55 57.93 
Std. Dev.  7.32  8.34 17.15 
Maximum   36  33.4 92.02 
Minimum  13  3.8 25.44 
In columns 1 and 2, the summary statistics for the family farms share and IPR are for 1998, 
while those in column 3 are for the percentage of the population in urban areas from 1960 to 
2004. The ranking goes from 1 to 18 where 1 is the most unequal and 18 the most equal in 
terms of the family farms share and the IPR.. Guatemala and Honduras did not reach 50 
percent of urban population by the period between 2000 and 2004.  
 
Source: Vanhanen (2003a) and World Development Indicators (2006). 
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Table 3.6 Growth Model with Inequality (Robustness)  
           
  1 2 3 4 5 
Constant 0.12 0.16 0.17 0.16 0.12 
























 (2.76) (2.67) (2.91) (2.66) (3.32) 
ln(n + g + δ) t 0.01 0.02 0.01 0.02 0.003 
 (0.53) (1.15) (0.84) (1.26) (0.15) 
ln(school) t 0.001 0.002 0.002 0.002 0.001 
 (0.53) (0.82) (0.82) (0.76) (0.51) 





















  (4.10) (3.66) (4.02) (2.58) 
ln(G/Y) t   -0.008
 b
   
   (2.21)   
Polity growth t    0.001
 a
  
    (4.28)   
Urban dummyt-1     -0.005 
     (1.17) 
Urban dummyt-1 
* IPR t-1     -0.0003 
     (0.669) 
R-squared 0.49 0.52 0.53 0.52 0.55 
t-statistics in parentheses use White’s robust standard errors. a, b, and c represent statistical 
significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively. All estimations have 90 
observations. Only the estimation in column 5 has 72 observations since urban population 
rates are not available in the 1950s. Estimations include time dummies but coefficients are 

















Table 3.7 Equality Measure Regressed on Instrument 
     
  1 2 
Constant 23.45 7.92 
 (195.42) (76.63) 
ln(wheat-sugar ratio)*ln(Pwheat) 0.70 3.32
 a
 
 (0.94) (5.23) 
R-squared 0.14 0.77 
   
Correlation ln(wheat-sugar ratio)*ln(Pwheat) and family farms 0.07  
Correlation ln(wheat-sugar ratio)*ln(Pwheat) and IPR 0.50  
t-statistics in parentheses use White’s robust standard errors. a, b, and c represent statistical 
significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively. All estimations have 90 





Table 3.8 Growth Model with Instrument for Equality and Investment 
     
  1 2 
Constant 0.34 0.33 






 (4.00) (5.10) 
ln(I/Y) t 0.003 -0.0003 
 (0.26) (0.01) 





 (4.02) (8.47) 
ln(school) t 0.001 0.003 














 (2.19) (-2.42) 
R-squared 0.22 0.34 
t-statistics in parentheses use White’s robust standard errors. a, b, and c represent statistical 
significance at the 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively. All estimations have 72 
observations. Estimations include time dummies but coefficients are not shown for space 
purposes. Instruments used in the 2SLS estimation in Column 1: second lag of inequality, 
time dummies, and the natural log of the wheat-sugar ratio times the natural log of the 
period average price of wheat. Instruments used in the 2SLS estimation in Column 2: first 
lag of investment, second lag of inequality, time dummies, and the natural log of the wheat-
sugar ratio times the natural log of the period average price of wheat. 
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Figure 3.1 Nonlinear Effect of Family Farms Share on Growth  


































Figure 3.2 Nonlinear Effect of Family Farms Share on Growth  




































Figure 3.3 Nonlinear Effect of the Index of Power Resources on Growth  




































Figure 3.4 Nonlinear Effect of the Index of Power Resources on Growth  
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Table A.3.1 Availability of Income Gini Coefficients  
              
  1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 
Argentina  X X X       
Bolivia  X   X X 
Brazil   X X X X X 
Chile   X X X X X 
Colombia   X X  X X 
Costa Rica   X X X X X 
Dominican Republic    X X X X 
Ecuador     X X X 
El Salvador   X X  X X 
Guatemala     X X X 
Honduras   X  X X X 
Mexico  X X X X X X 
Nicaragua      X X 
Panama   X X X X X 
Paraguay      X X 
Peru    X X X X 
Uruguay   X     
Venezuela    X X X X X 
X if there is at least one Gini coefficient in the 10 year period that meets the following 
criteria: 
a) Sample covers the whole population and area of the country 
b) The income share unit is the household or family 
c) Estimation based on the income concept (where the income concept could be different 
 across countries and across time) 
 















Table A.3.2 Land Gini Coefficients Availability  
             
  1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000 
Argentina    X   X     
Bolivia  X     
Brazil   X  X   
Chile   X   X  
Colombia   X  X   
Costa Rica  X     
Dominican Republic  X     
Ecuador  X  X    
El Salvador  X     
Guatemala  X X     
Honduras  X    X  
Mexico   X     
Nicaragua  X     
Panama   X   X  
Paraguay   X   X  
Peru   X   X  
Uruguay   X     
Venezuela  X X         
X if there at least one land Gini coefficient in the 10 year period in Frankema’s Table A.1. 
 
Source: Frankema (2006). 
 
